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The Right to Earn a Living
Timothy Sandefur*
"The monopolizer engrosseth to himself what should be free for
all men."
-Edward Coke1
1. INTRODUCTION
"At common law," wrote William Blackstone, "every man
might use what trade he pleased."2 This seemingly innocuous
phrase, dropped offhandedly into a chapter on the obligations of
master and servant, hints at a rich common law tradition which
has largely been ignored-or even denied outright-by more mod-
em scholarship.
One representative sample of the modern view of economic
liberty is the following:
* College of Public Interest Law Fellow, Pacific Legal Foundation. J.D., Chapman
University School of Law, 2002; B.A., Hillsdale College, 1998. A much-abridged version of
this article appeared in 7 INDEPENDENT REV. 69 (2002). In the following paper, many quo-
tations from antique sources reproduce obsolete or incorrect spellings which appear in the
original. Using "sic" after all of these unique spellings would quickly become tedious.
Thus, these quotations are reproduced without the customary "sic" designation, except for a
few instances where the editors felt its inclusion was necessary to avoid the appearance of
typographical error. In addition, many of the cases discussed in this paper were written in
Law French, an odd mixture of Latin, Norman French, and English, which constituted a
unique legal language until the seventeenth century. These have been translated and
summarized. I wish to thank Harvard law student Alexander Volokh and Chapman Uni-
versity School of Law Professor John C. Eastman for their help.
I wish to dedicate this article to my father, Mark M. Sandefur, who, like his father
before him (a World War II veteran), has secured the blessings of liberty to himself and to
me, first by helping to win the Cold War, and now by working to win the war in which we
are engaged today.
Your fathers.., were peace men; but they preferred revolution to peaceful submis-
sion to bondage. They were quiet men; but they did not shrink from agitating
against oppression. They showed forbearance; but that they knew its limits. They
believed in order; but not in the order of tyranny. With them, nothing was "set-
tled" that was not right. With them, justice, liberty and humanity were "final;" not
slavery and oppression. You may well cherish the memory of such men.... They
seized upon eternal principles, and set a glorious example in their defense. Mark
them!
Frederick Douglass, What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?, reprinted in FREDERICK
DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 192 (P. Foner & Y. Taylor eds., 1999).
1 Quoted in CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 420 (1957).
2 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *427.
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I do not count the Supreme Court decisions defending con-
tract or property rights from state regulation as Bill of Rights
decisions. None of these cases represents a defense of civil liber-
ties. The Court merely used libertarian philosophy to protect
the wealthy from progressive legislation. The Court eventually
rejected these economic liberty decisions because they were not
connected to the text of the Constitution or any philosophy with
roots in the history and traditions of our nation and its demo-
cratic process.3
In Part I of this paper I will examine the history of the com-
mon law right to pursue a lawful occupation, to demonstrate just
how thoroughly wrong this view is. Part II will address the his-
tory of this right from the Magna Carta to the era of Sir Edward
Coke, who might rightly be regarded as the founding father of
what is now called "economic substantive due process."4 Part III
discusses the effect of Coke's works on the American Revolution,
and Part IV discusses his influence on the early period of Ameri-
can Constitutional history. Part V discusses the Slaughter-House
Cases,' and the treatment of the right to earn a living between
those cases and the New Deal era. Part VI discusses academic
criticism of these cases, and the triumph of legal positivism in
1937. Part VII will review the treatment of this right from 1937 to
the present day. It is my desire that this paper will at least illus-
trate that the economic substantive due process cases did not an-
nounce principles unknown to legal history-were not legal
interlopers gone beyond reasonable readings of precedent-and
that it was instead the 1937 repudiation of protections for eco-
nomic liberties that was the new, ahistorical reading of the law,6
and one which has proven itself to be fallacious and dangerous.
3 John E. Nowak, The 'Sixty Something'Anniversary of the Bill of Rights, 1992 U. ILL.
L. REV. 445, 452 (1992).
4 This term is generally used to refer to the theory, much reviled in the legal acad-
emy, that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prevent gov-
ernment from infringing on certain rights which are generally associated with "economic"
behaviors--e.g., property rights, or the right to earn a living. Today, the Due Process
Clauses are seen as protecting rights such as the right to privacy, but not economic free-
doms. That the term "economic substantive due process" dissolves on closer inspection,
particularly because there is no principled distinction between "economic" and "personal"
rights, is one of the major themes of this article. Another theme, that the Due Process
Clause was interpreted as including a substantive component long before the nineteenth
century, has been thoroughly explored by Bernard Siegan, particularly in his recent book.
See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM THE MAGNA CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (2001).
5 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
6 See infra note 230.
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II. BEFORE THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
A. Magna Carta to Lord Coke
By Magna Carta, "[aill merchants are to be safe and secure in
leaving and entering England, and in staying and traveling [sic]
in England... to buy and sell free from all maletotes by the an-
cient and rightful customs ... 7' Although Magna Carta's impor-
tance has been greatly exaggerated, the "myth of Magna Carta"
was built by men who were simultaneously building the back-
ground tradition of English and American liberty.' Before (and
after) Magna Carta, the king exercised a vaguely defined sweep of
power called the "prerogative,"9 by which he could grant certain
exclusive rights, or "franchises" to his subjects. But from early on,
the English suspicion of the prerogative power manifested itself in
resistance to these royal grants of exclusive rights to trade.
Thus Fortescue, whose De Laudibus Legum Anglie' ° was writ-
ten in 1471, wrote that:
In the realm of England, no one ... [is] hindered from pro-
viding himself with salt or any goods whatever, at his own plea-
sure and of any vendor.... Nor can the king there, by himself
or by his ministers, impose tallages, subsidies, or any other bur-
dens whatever on his subjects, nor change their laws, nor make
new ones, without the concession or assent of his whole realm
... in ... parliament."
Fortescue believed that this relative economic freedom was re-
sponsible for England's prosperity and he was largely right. 2 Of
course, the monarchy was hardly a free-market institution, but as
far back as the reign of Edward III, common law courts had been
concerned with protecting the subject's right to economic freedom.
In 1377, the court struck down a royal monopoly which had been
granted to a man named John Peachie, on the sale of wine in
London.'3 The court held this to be a violation of the right of free
7 J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 461-63 (2d ed. 1992). By the Confirmatio Cartarum, King
Edward I acknowledged that the Magna Carta had become common law. CONFIRMATIO
CARTARUM (Nov. 5, 1297), available at http//www.constitution.org/eng/confircartarum.
htm.
8 See WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE BIRTH OF BRITAIN 254-57 (Barnes & Noble Books
1993) (1956); HOLT, supra note 7, at 2-22, 378-405 (describing the rise of the "myth of
Magna Carta").
9 See generally 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *271-73. Blackstone also discusses
the effects of prerogative in corporate law. 1 id. at *467-85.
lo "In Praise of the Laws of England" (per author's own translation).
11 SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIE 87 (S.B. Chrimes ed. and trans.,
Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1986) (1545).
12 Id. at 87-89.
13 EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *181(William S. Hein Co. 1986) (1797) [hereinafter COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES]; 4
SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 344 (3d ed. 1945).
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trade. 4 Similarly, in John Dier's Case,'15 Chief Justice Holt ruled
against a monopoly charter, holding that he would have impris-
oned anyone who had claimed such a monopoly on his own
authority.1
6
Thus, the right of the king to control the economy was limited
at common law, by a right, the importance of which must have
been very obvious in an era where starvation and pestilence were
daily experiences. The right to support oneself by a lawful call-
ing17 was not only central to the health of the state, but to the lives
of citizens. Such economic liberties were protected in, for exam-
ple, Prior of Christchurch Canterbury v. Bendysshe, in which the
court held that merely selling products adjacent to an existing
seller does not constitute a cause of action, even though it might
injure an existing seller.' As Holdsworth said, "the medieval
[sic] judges favoured the principle [of free trade], just as they
favoured the principle of freedom of alienation, because they were
hostile to all arbitrary restrictions on personal liberty, or rights of
property, for which no legal justification could be shown."'9
B. Lord Coke
By far the most outspoken defender of the right to earn a liv-
ing was Sir Edward Coke.2" speaker of the House of Commons,
then attorney general for Queen Elizabeth, Coke was appointed
Chief Justice of King's Bench by King James 1.21 Coke is best
remembered today for his decision in Dr. Bonham's Case,22 in
which he asserted the supremacy of the law over the king.23 But
Coke was also the leading opponent of royal monopolies. 24 This is
rather ironic, since, as Elizabeth's Attorney General, Coke was re-
14 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 344 n.6.
15 2 Y.B. Henry V *26 (per author's own translation).
16 See also The Case of the Tailors, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218, 1219 (K.B. 1615) (citing Dier's
Case, and noting that "there Hull held, that the bond was against the common law, and by
G-d if the plaintiff was here, he should go to prison till he paid a fine to the King").
17 Throughout this paper, I will use interchangeably such terms as "the right to a
lawful calling," "the right to pursue a lawful occupation," "the right to earn an honest liv-
ing," and so forth. I find the term "right of livelihood" to have been tainted by frequent
misuse. See infra text accompanying note 274.
is 93 SELDEN SOCIETY 8, 9 (1503).
[D]amage alone is not a cause of action. Thus, [where] an innkeeper or other vict-
ualler comes and dwells next to another [innkeeper] and thereby more of the cus-
tomers resort to him than to the other, it is a damage to the other but no wrong, for
he cannot compel men to buy victuals from him rather than from the other.
93 id. (second and third alteration in original). See also Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng.
Rep. 1127, 1128 (KB. 1707).
19 11 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 477-78 (footnotes omitted).
20 See BOWEN, supra note 1.
21 Id. at 340-41.
22 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610).
23 See BOWEN, supra note 1, at 314-17.
24 Id. at 420.
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quired to argue on behalf of the plaintiff in the famous Case of
Monopolies, or Darcy v. Allen, in 1602.25 Edward Darcy had re-
ceived a monopoly to sell playing cards from the monarchy. Allen
then made and sold playing cards, and Darcy sued." Chief Justice
Popham ruled for the defendant. As Coke wrote:
All.. . trades, as well mechanical as others, which prevent idle-
ness (the bane of the commonwealth) and exercise men and
youth in labour, for the maintenance of themselves and their
families, and for the increase of their substance, to serve the
Queen when occasion shall require, are profitable for the com-
monwealth, and therefore the grant to the plaintiff to have the
sole making of them is against the common law, and the benefit
and liberty of the subject. .... 27
Today, those who criticize the concept of "economic due pro-
cess" essentially argue that protection of freedom of contract is
merely a guise for the wealthy to oppress the poor or to prevent
regulations which aim to protect the safety and health of the peo-
ple.2" Some critics have even contended that economic due process
is an attempt to "enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,"29
25 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602).
26 For an enlightening history of this case, see Jacob I. Corrd, The Argument, Decision,
and Reports of Darcy v. Allen, 45 EMORY L.J. 1261 (1996).
27 77 Eng. Rep. at 1262-63. Note that this was the argument of one of the attorneys
in the case, not an opinion by Popham. Id. at 1262. Popham and the court did not explain
their decision in print. Corr6, supra note 26, at 1269-70.
28 Although I quote many such critics throughout this article, this view is so prevalent
that it would be impossible to cite all but a fraction of them here. See, e.g., Paul D. Car-
rington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correcting the Excessive Indepen-
dence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 431-32 (1999) (arguing that Lochner was
an example of "misuse of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate humane state legisla-
tion"); Cornell W. Clayton, Toward a Theory of the Washington Constitution, 37 GONZ. L.
REV. 41, 51 (2002) ("The U.S. Supreme Court's use of rights doctrines to invalidate progres-
sive legislation during the Lochner era attests to the fact that the protection of rights can
advance causes on the political right as well as that of the left."). See also Jane Rutherford,
The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U.L. REV. 1, 12 (1992) (arguing that "[t]he Lochner era deci-
sions . . .protected private enterprise from the incursions of an impoverished majority,
echo[ing] the original Framers' fear of the poor masses"). Rutherford recognizes that the
Founders probably would have "approved of a baker's 'right' to work sixteen hours per day.
Born without property, a person could only hope to acquire such property by dint of ex-
traordinary effort. Indeed, limiting the baker's 'right' to work sixteen hours a day may
have relegated him to a life of poverty." Id. Yet she proceeds to argue that "[tihe anti-
regulatory decisions err (are substantively arbitrary) because they fail to balance power in
favor of the oppressed," which of course begs the question. Id. Mr. Lochner, after all, won
his case.
29 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes' re-
mark, and his further explanation that a constitution is "made for people of fundamentally
differing views" and is "not intended to embody a particular economic theory" can be ques-
tioned. Id. at 75-76. A constitution is exactly where a particular political and economic
theory is embodied. The United States Constitution explicitly protects private property,
contracts, and even a gold standard. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Id. art I, § 10, cl. 1. In-
deed, what is a constitution, if it is not an enactment of a particular economic and political
system? Classical philosophers such as Aristotle and Augustine theorized that political
society is (in Augustine's words) "an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgement
of right, and by a community of interests." See AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 19:23-24,
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and consequently a threat of rampant laissez-faire, leaving the
consumer no protection against faulty or dangerous products. Yet
the common law courts, which had always defended freedom of
contract, had also always upheld the right of the government to
regulate or license dangerous occupations to protect the consumer.
Indeed, evidence of judicial consumer protection dates back to
the twelfth century.30 Glanville wrote that "if the seller has sold
the thing to the buyer as sound and without fault and the buyer
can afterwards satisfactorily prove that at the time of the contract
the thing was not sound and had a fault, then the seller will be
bound to take back his thing."31 Ancient court reports are also full
of cases which protect the consumer from fraud or from shoddy
merchandise. For instance, in the Leet Rolls of Edward I, "Robert
Suffield [was found liable] for making fraud etc., by selling oil of
one kind for oil of another kind," and was fined four shillings.2 In
another case, "all those Sprowston men... knowingly buy measly
pigs, and they sell the said sausages and puddings, unfit for
human bodies, in Norwich market."33 The Fair Court of St. Ives
routinely dealt with similar cases in which, for instance, a loaf of
reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL AUGUSTINE 211 (Vernon J. Bourke ed., 2d ed. 1974). See also
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1:2, reprinted in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 555 (Richard McKeon
ed., 1947) ("[Tlhe state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and con-
tinuing in existence for the sake of a good life."). Thus, classical political theory lends sup-
port to the idea that at least one of the purposes of a constitution is to delineate common
societal interests in order to affect the public's common political and economic goals. While
such modernists as Holmes may have rejected this view, even their view, that society is
only a means of organizing and bargaining for political power, would beg the question: On
what premises does a society create the rules for that bargaining? Further, even if the
Constitution is only a procedural document, the decisions that lead to those procedural
arrangements are certainly based on at least an implicit judgment of good and bad. It is
harder for the Congress, for example, to overrule the President's veto than for the Congress
to pass a law with the President's consent. Ostensibly, this is because a law which the
President does not approve is more likely to be a "bad" law than a law which both the
President and the Congress agree upon. To have made the procedure (i.e., the power-shar-
ing) more difficult in one case than in the other embodies a judgment of good and bad which
can only be called a "particular political theory." Likewise, the Constitution prohibits any
state from "mak[ing] any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts."
U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1. This rule can only be explained by reference to "a particular
economic theory." See also CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 324 (1946) ("The Constitution was essentially an eco-
nomic document based upon the concept that the fundamental private rights of property
are anterior to government and morally beyond the reach of popular majorities.").
30 See Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133,
1157-59 (1931).
31 RANULF DE GLANVILL, THE TREATISE ON THE LAwS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF
ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL 129 (G.D.G. Hall trans. & ed., Thomas Nelson &
Sons 1965) (1189).
32 Leet Roll of 24 Edward I. 129 5/6, in 5 THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 47
(1891).
33 Leet Roll of 24 Edward I. 128 7/8, in 5 THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 8
(1891).
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bread was found "deficient in weight," and the seller fined,34 or
where "Adam Cabel sells whelks with good and bad mixed
together." 5
The courts have acknowledged the legitimacy of government
regulations to protect consumers, though they have not held that
the right to pursue a given occupation necessarily meant being
free from basic safety and other similar regulations. For example,
the courts never held that the state could not prohibit the exercise
of a lawful trade on Sabbath days. 6 Rather, the common law held
that such regulations were invalid when used for the purpose of
keeping an honest person out of the market." In the Case of the
City of London,3" the court ruled that "the King may erect guildam
mercatoriam, i.e., a fraternity or society or corporation of
merchants, to the end that good order and rule should be by them
observed for the increase and advancement of trade and merchan-
dise, and not for the hindrance or diminution of it."39 In other
words, government could regulate trade impartially, but not in or-
der to prevent the free exercise of a lawful calling. The cases
agreed with the principle explained by Friedrich Hayek: "[A] free
system does not exclude on principle all those general regulations
of economic activity which can be laid down in the form of general
rules specifying conditions which everybody who engages in a cer-
tain activity must satisfy"-for example, a ban on the production
and sale of phosphorus matches for reasons of health.40 Truly be-
nign regulations of trade may result in greater economic efficiency
by reducing production costs.4 Thus, while Hayek acknowledged
that such regulations might sometimes be worthwhile,42 he
warned that "[tihe economist will remain suspicious and hold that
there is a strong presumption against such measures because
their over-all cost is almost always underestimated and because
one disadvantage in particular-namely, the prevention of new
34 Pleas of the Fair on Wednesday Before the Feast of St. Dunstan the Bishop in the
Aforesaid Year (A.D. 1302), in 23 THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 83 (1908).
35 Leet Roll of 24 Edward I. 128 7/8, supra note 33, at 10.
36 See Crepps v. Durden, 98 Eng. Rep. 1283, 1284 (K.B. 1777).
37 This point was put succinctly in an 1833 New York case, where the court said that
.a by-law that no meat should be sold in the village would be bad, being a general restraint;
but that meat shall not be sold except in a particular place is good, not being a restraint of
the right to sell meat, but a regulation of that right." Village of Buffalo v. Webster, 10
Wend. 99, 101 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833) (emphasis added).
38 77 Eng. Rep. 658 (KB. 1610).
39 Id. at 663. Accord Walter v. Hanger, 72 Eng. Rep. 935 (KB. 1602) (per author's
own translation).
40 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 224-25 (1960).
41 Id. Note here the similarity to what Richard Epstein has called "Implicit In-Kind
Compensation." RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 195 (1985).
42 HAYEK, supra note 40, at 224-25.
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developments-can never be fully taken into account."" As a
1727 case indicated, a restraint on trade is acceptable so long as
the party exercises the trade somewhere, but is undesirable if it
tends to prevent the exercise of the trade anywhere." A South
Carolina court put it more simply. A city may regulate a trade,
"b]ut the suppression of a trade is not a regulation. To be regu-
lated, the trade must subsist."45
In Davenant v. Hurdis,46 Coke argued the same point-that
although a "by-law" which regulated the practice of a trade was
legitimate, a law which restrained trade was unjust. He reas-
serted this stance some twenty-eight years later in Monopolies:
"[01rdinances for the better rule and government of the company
... are consonant to law and reason," but an ordinance which re-
quired a person to have clothing only made by a particular guild of
tailors "was against the common law, because it was against the
liberty of the subject .. .
Another example is Allen v. Tooley," in which an upholsterer
was sued for failure to serve an apprenticeship before taking up
his trade. Coke, who by this time had become Chief Justice of
King's Bench, ruled that "no skill there is in this, for he may well
learn this in seven hours."49 As unskilled labor, it was not subject
to the sort of licensing restrictions appropriate to more technical
trades. The court in Tooley lucidly explained the common law's
view of regulations for the protection of consumers:
43 Id.
44 Chesman ex Ux' v. Nainby, 93 Eng. Rep. 819, 821 (K.B. 1727).
The reason why particular restraints [on trade] are allowed is, because the publick
is not concerned, so long as the party exercises the trade somewhere. But if it
tends to prevent the exercise of [the trade] any where, it is not to be endured;
because the publick loses the benefit of the party's labour, and the party himself is
rendered an [sic] useless member the community.
Id. Or to put it in the words of a 1787 text on English legal history:
Many other statutes were made [in the reign of Henry VIIIi for the conducting of
different manufactures, of which, as well as of the other acts of this and the follow-
ing reigns, it may be observed in general, that they had a tendency to give prefer-
ences to corporations and fraternities, and to encourage a spirit of monopoly.
4 JOHN REEVES, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW FROM THE TIME OF THE SAXONS TO THE END
OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP AND MARY 230 (2d ed. 1787). See also Wannel v. Camerar' Civit'
London, 93 Eng. Rep. 775, 775-76 (K.B. 1726).
We are all of opinion, that this is a good by-law, being made in regulation of trade,
and to prevent fraud and unskilfulness [sic], of which none but a company that
exercise the same trade can be judges. This does not take away his right to his
freedom, but only his election of what company he shall be free ....
Id. Accord Player v. Vere, 83 Eng. Rep. 149 (K.B. 1691), also reported at 83 Eng. Rep. 168.
45 State v. Town Council of Columbia, 40 S.C.L. (6 Rich.) 404, 415 (1853). Accord
Sweet v. City of Wabash, 41 Ind. 7 (1872); Town of Cantril v. Sainer, 12 N.W. 753, 753-54
(Iowa 1882); City of Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kan. 622, 626 (1874).
46 72 Eng. Rep. 769 (I-B. 1574) (per author's own translation).
47 Darcy v. Allen, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1263 (KB. 1602).
48 80 Eng. Rep. 1055 (K.B. 1614).
49 Id. at 1057.
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[B]y the very common law, it was lawful for any man to use any
trade thereby to maintain himself and his family; this was both
lawful, and also very commendable, but yet by the common law,
if a man will take upon him to use any trade, in the which he
hath no skill; the law provides a punishment for such offenders,
and such persons were to be punished in the court leet, and by
actions brought, as by the cases before .... "
The court cited the example of a blacksmith who injured a horse
because he was not skilled in his trade-proper legal redress, the
court explained, was already available in the form of a suit for
damages. "Unskilfulness [sic] is a sufficient punishment for him,"
Chief Justice Coke said,51 but the case settled out of court before a
final decision. 2 In short, the common law view was that skilled
trades were subject to regulation only in order to increase or ad-
vance trade, but not to hinder it. 53 In the Case of the Tailors
(1615), Coke again wrote that "at the common law, no man could
be prohibited from working in any lawful trade, for the law abhors
idleness," 4 and thus "the common law abhors all monopolies,
which prohibit any from working in any lawful trade ....
Coke's defense of the free market in these cases was not in-
tended to protect the rich, but exactly the opposite: to defend the
poor from legal restrictions on the freedom which gave them a
chance to work their way out of poverty. It was the wealthy who
benefited from monopoly practices. When, furious over Dr. Bon-
ham's Case, James finally fired him, Coke entered the House of
Commons and continued his attack on the monopolies: "The mo-
nopolizer engrosseth to himself what should be free for all men,"
he said.56 Finally, he managed to get an act passed, the Statute of
Monopolies, which declared that all monopolies-save temporary
patents, used to encourage innovation-"are altogether contrary
to the laws of the realm, and so are and shall be utterly void and of
none effect and in no wise to be put in use or execution."57 In his
Commentaries on American Law, Chancellor Kent referred to the
Statute of Monopolies as "magna charta for British industry," and
quoted the view that it "contained a noble principle, and secured
to every subject unlimited freedom of action, provided he did no
injury to others, nor violated statute law." 8
50 Id. at 1055.
51 Id. at 1059.
52 Id.
53 See also Chamberlain of London's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 150, 151 (KB. 1592) (uphold-
ing regulation of trade where it is "made ... to prevent all frauds and falsities").
54 77 Eng, Rep. 1218, 1219 (K.B. 1615).
55 Id.
56 BOWEN, supra note 1, at 420.
57 21 Jac. 1 c. 3.
58 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *272 n.(c) (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed.,
Fred B. Rothman & Co. 12th ed. 1999) (1873).
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Coke was not the only judge who argued that mopopolies vio-
lated the common law.59 In Colgate v. Bacheler,0 the court held
that:
[TIhis condition is against law, to prohibit or restrain any to use
a lawful trade at any time... for as well as he may restrain him
for one time.., he may restrain him for longer times.., being
freemen, it is free for them to exercise their trade in any
place.... [A party] ought not to be abridged of his trade and
living."
In the 1632 case of Mounson v. Lyster, the court struck down a
monopoly under the Statute of Monopolies.62 Only a few years
earlier, the court struck down an ordinance of the Company of
Bricklayers which prohibited the plastering of chimney bricks
with lime, and permitting only the Company of Plasterers to do
the job. 3
But it was Coke who fought monopolies so intensely that his
name became permanently associated with freedom of trade. Af-
ter he retired from Parliament, he wrote a series of books, the In-
stitutes of the Common Law of England, which were to be the
training books for generations of lawyers, including Thomas Jef-
ferson, John Adams, and John Marshall.' In a chapter on monop-
olies, Coke wrote that "all grants of monopolies are against the
ancient and fundamentall [sic] laws of this kingdome," because "a
mans trade is accounted his life, because it maintaineth his life;
and therefore the monopolist that taketh away a mans trade,
taketh away his life .... 65 In short, "[n]o man ought to be put
from his livelihood without answer."66
So likewise, and for the same reason, if a graunt be made to
any man, to have the sole making of cards, or the sole dealing
with any other trade, that graunt is against the liberty and
freedome of the subject, that before did, or lawfully might have
used that trade, and consequently against this great charter.
Generally all monopolies are against this great charter, be-
cause they are against the liberty and freedome of the subject,
and against the law of the land.67
59 See also Weaver of Newbery's Case, 72 Eng. Rep. 962, 962 (KB. 1616) (per author's
own translation).
6o 78 Eng. Rep. 1097 (K.B. 1602).
61 Id. at 1097.
62 82 Eng. Rep. 122, 122 (K.B. 1632) (per author's own translation).
63 Les Brick-Layers & Tilers v. Les Plaisterers, 81 Eng. Rep. 871, 872 (1624) (per au-
thor's own translation).
64 BOWEN, supra note 1, at 513-14.
65 COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 13, at *181.
66 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *47
(William S. Hein Co. 1986) (1797) [hereinafter COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES].
67 Id.
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The "Myth of Magna Carta," largely Coke's invention, had
come down to earth. Monopolies were anathema to the generation
that grew up reading the Institutes. In 1678, the Court of King's
Bench found a Mr. Ripton not guilty of "exercising the trade of a
grocer, not having served an apprentiship," because "any man at
common-law might use what trade he pleaseth."I In 1685, in
Thomas v. Sorrel,69 the Court of Exchequer Chamber noted that
"any free-man of London... may trade in any part of England." °
In 1687, King's Bench struck down a monopoly which had been
granted for "the sole printing of blank writs, bonds, and inden-
tures."71 In 1695, the court struck down an ordinance requiring
that "every person using the occupation of music and dancing" in
London should be a member of the Company of Musicians, calling
the law monopolistic.72
In the 1718 case of Parry v. Berry,73 the court held that "with-
out a custom such a bye-law, to restrain persons not being free of
the borough from exercising a trade, cannot be maintained ....
Probably the most famous of these cases is Keeble v. Hickeringill,75
in which the plaintiff complained that the defendant was firing off
a gun to frighten ducks away from his duck-pond, "intending to
damnify the plaintiff in his vivary, and to fright and drive away
the wildfowl... and deprive him of his profit ... ."" Chief Justice
Holt wrote that "when a man useth his art or his skill to take
[ducks], to sell and dispose of for his profit; this is his trade; and
he that hinder another in his trade or livelihood is liable to an
action for so hindering him."77 Hickeringill's protection of the
right to earn a living continues through the English cases of the
eighteenth century, providing the necessary legal protection for
the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.7
68 Wade v. Ripton, 84 Eng. Rep. 79, 79 (K.B. 1678).
69 84 Eng. Rep. 689 (K.B. 1685).
70 Id. at 689.
71 Earl of Yarmouth v. Darrel, 87 Eng. Rep. 48, 48 (K.B. 1687).
72 Robinson v. Groscourt, 87 Eng. Rep. 547, 547 (KB. 1695).
73 92 Eng. Rep. 1066 (K.B. 1718).
74 Id. at 1066. See also The King v. Co. of Fishermen of Faversham, 101 Eng. Rep.
1429, 1430 (KB. 1799) (a private agreement not to compete is legal, but a law in restraint
of trade is harmful); Mitchell v. Reynold, 92 Eng. Rep. 859, 859 (K.B. 1714) (Private con-
tracts in restraint of trade, "where no particular consideration is to balance the restraint of
trade ... are void, in what form soever the contract appears."); Broad v. Jollyfe, 79 Eng.
Rep. 509, 509 (K.B. 1616).
75 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1707). See also A.W. BRIAN SIMPsoN, LEADING CASES IN
THE COMMON LAw 45-75 (1996).
76 Keeble, 103 Eng. Rep. at 1128.
77 Id.
78 Law reports from this era and earlier frequently record only the attorney's argu-
ments, or only the judge's words, and do not record other material. In Robinson v. Watkins,
90 Eng. Rep. 165 (K.B. 1702), the reporter has carefully preserved the long and eloquent
argument of the defendant's counsel, and then reports of the outcome only that the matter
"was settled in Parliament," without saying what the settlement was. Id. at 171. The re-
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III. COKE'S LEGACY IN AMERICA
The result of all this, in no small part, would be the American
Revolution. After the repeal of the Townshend Duties in 1773,
Jefferson wrote that "[n]othing of particular excitement occurring
for a considerable time our countrymen seemed to fall into a state
of insensibility to our situation."79 The immediate crisis of the
Townshend Acts being over, the tradesmen who made up Boston's
Sons of Liberty had returned home, and the American Revolution
teetered on the brink. It was monopoly that pushed it over. 0
When George III granted the East India Company the right not
only to ship tea, but to sell it in America, workers who were now
legally closed out of a livelihood reacted with the famous Boston
Tea Party.s"
The founding generation probably understood monopoly in a
way we do not. To them, the term monopoly meant a company
port, however, is strong evidence that by 1702, the English courts regarded it as a settled
matter that "the common law.., leaves it lawful for any man to exercise a lawful imploy-
ment [sic] .... " Id. at 169. See also Harrison v. Godman, 97 Eng. Rep. 161, 163-65 (KB.
1756) (striking down licensing requirement for butchers); Rex v. Combs, 90 Eng. Rep. 454,
454 (K.B. 1702) ("[A]n indictment, which sets forth that there is an antient [sic] custom in
Winchester, that no person should exercise any trade till free of the Guild of Merchants
there ... was quashed without difficulty."). Yet still the courts upheld regulations which
were necessary to continue the trade or protect quality. See, e.g., Clark v. Le Cren, 109
Eng. Rep. 20, 22 (K.B. 1829) ("By common law, any person may carry on any trade in any
place, unless there be a custom to the contrary... but if there be no such custom, a by-law
in restraint of trade will be bad."); Bricheno v. Thorp, 37 Eng. Rep. 864, 865 (K.B. 1821) ("A
gentleman going into business for himself must not carry into it the secrets of his master;
but, on the other hand, I think it my duty to take care that he may not be prevented from
engaging in any business that he may fairly and honourably take."); King ex rel. Coates v.
Coopers Co. of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 101 Eng. Rep. 1123, 1123 (K.B. 1798) (by-law op-
pressing trade is void); Kirk v. Nowill, 99 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1006 (K.B. 1786) (striking down
regulation of manufacture of cutlery where penalty was forfeiture); Hesketh v. Braddock,
97 Eng. Rep. 1130 (K.B. 1766).
In the regulation of their own members, [guilds] may indeed make bye-laws ....
But if corporations were to try their own suits against strangers upon a bye-law
"for excluding all traders but themselves," there would be an end of the distinction
which has long been established, "that a bye-law which lays this restraint upon
trade is void, unless there be a custom to support it."
Id. at 1136; Rex v. Harrison, 97 Eng. Rep. 854, 857 (K.B. 1762) (upholding licensing re-
quirement for butchers because it "is only regulating the trade to what is most right and
reasonable."); Rex v. Master of Co. of Surgeons, 97 Eng. Rep. 621, 621 (K.B. 1759) (uphold-
ing requirement that surgeon's apprentice must understand Latin); Bosworth v. Hearne,
93 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1047-48 (K.B. 1738) (by-law permissible if reasonable and not in re-
straint of trade).
79 Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 6 (Merrill D.
Peterson ed., 1984).
so See, e.g., THOMAS FLEMING, LIBERTY!: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 75, 77 (1997)
(British trade restrictions "virtually made the government the East India Company's per-
manent partner."); JOHN C. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 341 (1943)
("The menace of monopoly united virtually all businessmen-whether smugglers or honest
traders-in opposition to the East India Company."); SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 203 (1965) (noting colonial reaction to tea monopoly).
81 MORISON, supra note 80, at 203-04. See also A.J. LANGGUTH, PATmOTS: THE MEN
WHO STARTED THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 179-84 (1988).
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insulated from competition by a special legal privilege which
barred others from competing, and thereby earning a living. It
was not what we mean by the term today-simply a large and
successful company, often one which has succeeded in spite of the
law. Microsoft, for instance, was not what Thomas Jefferson or
Adam Smith meant when they denounced "monopoly." The Post
Office is.2 It was precisely the fact that the government made
illegal harmless competition-indeed, helpful competition-that
upset the founding generation." In their famous "Cato's Letters,"
published in 1721, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon wrote
that while free trade "will turn Deserts into fruitful Fields, Vil-
lages into great Cities, Cottages into Palaces," the state's exercise
of arbitrary power would pervert trade into a weapon or a catas-
trophe. 4 Trenchard and Gordon believed that those who used
"Bribes or Favour," to establish "exclusive Companies" prospered
only at the expense of honest merchants who simply lacked politi-
cal connections.8 5
Some may remark that Thomas Jefferson's ringing phraseol-
ogy in the Declaration of Independence was meant to depart from
John Locke's earlier defense of the rights of "life, liberty, and es-
tate," or "life, liberty and property." In light of Jefferson's other
82 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *159 (defining monopoly as "a license
or privilege allowed by the king for the sole buying and selling, making, working, or using
of any thing whatsoever; whereby the subject in general is restrained from that liberty of
manufacturing or trading which he had before."). Adam Smith wrote:
The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can be got. The
natural price, or the price of free competition, on the contrary, is the lowest which
can be taken, not upon every occasion indeed, but for any considerable time to-
gether. The one is upon every occasion the highest which can be squeezed out of
the buyers, or which, it is supposed, they will consent to give: The other is the
lowest which the sellers can commonly afford to take, and at the same time con-
tinue their business.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 65
(Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (1776). Note that software prices have consistently fallen while
postage stamps have consistently risen. See also Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 550-51
(1892).
There are two kinds of monopoly; one of law, the other of fact. The one exists when
exclusive privileges are granted. Such a monopoly, the law which creates alone
can break; and being the creation of law, justifies legislative control. A monopoly
of fact any one can break, and there is no necessity for legislative interference. It
exists where anyone by his money and labor furnishes facilities for business which
no one else has. A man puts up in a city the only building suitable for offices. He
has therefore a monopoly of that business; but it is a monopoly of fact, which any-
one can break who, with like business courage puts his means into a similar
building.
Id. (Brewer, J., dissenting); see also GEORGE REISMAN, CAPITALISM: A TREATISE ON ECONOM-
ics 375-440 (1996) (detailing two different meanings of the term "monopoly").
s3 See generally THOMAS G. WEST, VINDICATING THE FOUNDERS: RACE, SEX, CLASS, AND
JUSTICE IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA 37-70 (1997).
84 John Trenchard, Trade and Naval Power the Offspring of Civil Liberty Only, and
Cannot Subsist Without It (Feb. 3, 1721), in THE ENGLISH LIBERTARIAN HERITAGE 146
(David L. Jacobson ed., 1965).
85 Id. at 147.
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influences, it is evident that Jefferson's use of the phrase, "life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," was meant to assert this
right of livelihood. Earlier in 1776, George Mason had begun the
Virginia Declaration of Rights with the phrase, "That all men are
by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inher-
ent rights ... namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and ob-
taining happiness and safety."86 Jefferson, who read Mason's dec-
laration with interest while he labored away in Philadelphia, was
very concerned with social mobility; he resented what he would
later call the "artificial aristocracy," and wanted instead to foster
the "natural aristocracy" of "virtue and talents.""7 That govern-
ment was best which most efficiently enabled the natural aristoc-
racy to rise, he said, and America presented a unique opportunity
to create such a government. "Here every one may have land to
labor for himself if he chuses; or, preferring the exercise of any
other industry, may exact for it such compensation as not only to
afford a comfortable subsistence, but wherewith to provide for a
cessation from labor in old age. " s In his first inaugural address,
Jefferson defined "the sum of good government" as one which
"shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them
otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and im-
provement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it
has earned."89 "[Elvery one has a natural right to choose for his
pursuit such one of them as he thinks most likely to furnish him
subsistence," he wrote.90 Surely this is "the pursuit of happiness."
James Madison summed up these ideas keenly in his essay "Prop-
erty"-
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under
it, where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies
deny to part of its citizens that free use of their faculties, and
free choice of their occupations, which not only constitute their
property in the general sense of the word; but are the means of
acquiring property strictly so called. What must be the spirit of
legislation where a manufacturer of linen cloth is forbidden to
bury his own child in a linen shroud, in order to favour his
86 ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, GEORGE MASON: RELUCTANT STATESMAN 111 (1961) (em-
phasis added).
87 Letter of Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in THE ADAMS-JEFFER-
SON LETTERS 387, 388 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959).
s Id. at 391.
89 First Inaugural Address of Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 4, 1801), in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS 492, 494 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
90 Thomas Jefferson, Thoughts on Lotteries (Feb. 1826), in 17 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 448, 449 (A. Bergh ed., 1905). Jefferson drafted this memo while he
was asking the Virginia legislature for permission to hold a lottery to raffle off Monticello
and thereby pay off his crushing debts. Although he received permission, the lottery was a
failure. See DUMAS MALONE, THE SAGE OF MONTICELLO 473-82, 495-96 (1981).
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neighbour who manufactures woolen cloth; where the manufac-
turer and wearer of woolen cloth are again forbidden the ceco-
nomical [sic] use of buttons of that material, in favor of the
manufacturer of buttons of other materials!91
Bernard Siegan has said that "[tihe Framers might well be
described as commercial republicans."92 The specter of legally for-
bidding an honest person from making an honest living haunted
the founding generation so much that four states, when ratifying
the Constitution, included a ban on monopolies among their pro-
posed bills of rights.93 To the Framers of the Constitution, the
question of monopoly was not merely a matter of economic effi-
ciency. Rather, it was primarily a matter of natural right: the
right to engage in the very labor which Locke said was the founda-
tion of property rights to begin with: "[Elvery Man has a Property
in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself.
The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say,
are properly his."9" It was a matter of the free exercise of one's
faculties, a right granted by nature, and protected by the common
law. This is why Chancellor Kent referred to the Statute of Mo-
nopolies as protecting "freedom of action."
We can see this concern expressed also in the founders' atti-
tude toward patents and copyrights. In The Federalist Papers,
James Madison expressed his belief that "[t]he utility of the power
will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been sol-
emnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of common law."95
But in truth, Madison and Jefferson were quite suspicious of the
idea. Jefferson wrote to him that he wished the new Constitution
would prohibit monopolies. 'With regard to Monopolies they are
justly classed among the greatest nusances [sic] in Government.
But is it clear that as encouragements to literary works and inge-
nious discoveries, they are not too valuable to be wholly re-
nounced?"96 Jefferson agreed that the temporary monopolies
called patents and copyrights were useful, even while he disagreed
that they were legitimate from a natural rights point of view.97 In
91 James Madison, Property, reprinted in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 515, 516 (Jack N.
Rakove ed., 1999).
92 BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 104 (1980) [here-
inafter SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES].
93 See THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993). The states were
Massachusetts, id. at 1:944, North Carolina, id. at 2:571, New Hampshire, id. at 2:551, and
New York, id. at 2:542.
94 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 328-29 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1967) (1690).
95 THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 271 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
96 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (Oct. 17, 1788), in 1 THE REPUB-
LIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON
1776-1826, at 562, 566 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
97 See also William Grampp, A Reexamination of Jeffersonian Economics, in 1 THE
RANDOM HOUSE READERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 393-404 (Joseph Ernst et al., eds., 1970).
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a letter written in 1813, he expressed his deep concerns about the
monopolistic power inherent in patents. "Every man should be
protected in his lawful acts," he wrote. "But he is endamaged, if
forbidden to use a machine lawfully erected, at considerable ex-
pense, unless he will pay a new and unexpected price for it....
Laws, moreover, abridging the natural right of the citizen, should
be restrained by rigorous constructions within their narrowest
limits."' Jefferson and his contemporaries therefore presumed
strongly against laws which granted exclusive business privileges.
As the Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Charles River Bridge v.
Warren Bridge, "'[t]he exercise of the corporate franchise being re-
strictive of individual rights, cannot be extended beyond the letter
and spirit of the act of incorporation."'99
At the Constitutional Convention, the Framers debated a mo-
tion to establish "a [Congressional] power 'to grant charters of in-
corporation . ". .. 100 Some delegates objected because they
believed such a power might permit Congress to create monopo-
lies. George Mason, responding to these fears, stated that "[h]e
was afraid of monopolies of every sort, which he did not think
were by any means already implied" by the commerce clause.''
Historian Gordon S. Wood described the hostility with which
the founding generation greeted the notion of monopolies.
[Blecause of a republican aversion to chartered monopolies, the
creation of corporations [in early America] did not take place
without strenuous opposition and heated debate. As a conse-
quence, these corporations were radically transformed. Within
a few years most of them became very different from their mo-
narchical predecessors: they were no longer exclusive monopo-
lies and they were no longer public. They became private
property and what Samuel Blodget in 1806 called "rivals for the
common weal." And they were created in astonishing numbers
unduplicated anywhere else in the world.0 2
"What [Jefferson] wanted essentially was the increased incentive resulting from monopoly
grants without the ill effects of monopoly." Id. at 401.
98 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THOMAS JEF-
FERSON: WRITINGS 1286, 1287 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
99 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 546 (1837) (quoting Beatty v. Lessee of Knowler, 29 U.S. (4
Pet.) 152, 168 (1830)).
100 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 638 (Adrienne
Koch ed., 1966).
1O Id.
102 GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 318 (1992). At
the California Constitutional Convention of 1849, the subject of corporations was debated
at length in an exchange that reveals the way in which, as Paul Kens has put it, the nine-
teenth century saw "people with the same Jacksonian and free-labor roots split over the
meaning of liberty and the proper scope of government power." PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STE-
PHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 8 (1997). Delegate
Charles Botts warned the Convention that:
Corporations as they were originally known to the Roman law, had several benefi-
cial properties.... The institution as it was known when adopted by the common
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The revolution had been fought to prevent the arbitrary sway
over economic liberty which the throne exercised through (inter
alia) the monopoly power. Chancellor Kent explained:
"[Allthough corporations were found to be very beneficial in the
earlier periods of modern European history . . . their exclusive
privileges have too frequently served as monopolies, checking the
free circulation of labor, and enhancing the price of the fruits of
industry."103 These monopolies, writes Wood, "even when their
public purpose seemed obvious ... were repugnant to the spirit of
American republicanism, 'which does not admit of granting pecu-
liar privileges to any body of men."' 10 4 As Wood explained, this
principle did not lead early American legislatures or courts to
abolish the power to grant corporate charters, but led instead to
the widening of access to those charters: "IT]he legislatures opened
up the legal privileges to all who desired them." ' This meant
that "the traditional exclusivity of corporate charters [was]
destroyed." 06
Economic liberty was specifically protected in various parts of
the Constitution. The contracts clause, for instance, prohibited
any state from passing any law "impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts."107 The farmers who had made Shays' Rebellion (which
had served as a spur for holding a Constitutional Convention) had
sought, among other things, to have their debts annulled.' But
law, had engrafted upon it this doctrine: that to establish a corporation was the
great prerogative of the crown; and it followed soon with the numerous other pre-
rogatives of the crown ... and certain great privileges and immunities were given
to these corporations .... The Legislature should not be permitted to grant exclu-
sive privileges to these corporations; they are then not only harmless, but they are
useful.
J. Ross BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA, ON THE FOR-
MATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849, at 124-25 (1850).
103 2 KENT, supra note 58, at *271.
104 Wood, supra note 102, at 319.
1o5 Id. at 321.
106 Id.
107 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
108 See generally DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYs' REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN
INSURRECTION (1980); Jay S. Bybee, Insuring Domestic Tranquility: Lopez, Federalization
of Crime, And The Forgotten Role of The Domestic Violence Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1, 19-21 (1997); 1 MORMSON, supra note 80, at 390-94. One particularly revealing comment
on Shays' Rebellion is to be found in Arthur Miller's Pretense And Our Two Constitutions:
"Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786... terrified the propertied elite (and... [was]
quickly smashed by use of violence)." Arthur S. Miller, Pretense and Our Two Constitu-
tions, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 375, 384 (1986) [hereinafter Miller, Pretense]. Such a com-
ment totally overlooks the real consequences of the principles advocated by the Shaysites:
the drying up of credit that would have resulted from the abolition of debts, or the higher
prices caused by inflationary paper currency-all of which harm the poor most of all. Here
is how one contemporaneous observer of Shays' Rebellion described it:
There was a black cloud that rose in the east last winter, and spread over the
west... and burst upon us, and produced a dreadful effect. It brought on a state of
anarchy, and that led to tyranny.... People that used to live peaceably, and were
before good neighbors, got distracted, and took up arms against government...
and then, if you went to speak to them, you had the musket of death presented to
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protecting the right to make contracts was just as important for
the poor farmer as for the landlord. As Madison wrote in The Fed-
eralist Papers No. 44: "[L] aws impairing the obligation of contracts
... are contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to
every principle of sound legislation," and the prohibition of such
laws was a "bulwark in favor of personal security and private
rights."109 The founders understood that it is the poor who have
the most to gain from economic freedom, and that laws restricting
the freedom of contract are restrictions on the right to pursue hap-
piness-the very purpose of freedom itself. Although the right to
pursue a lawful occupation has been repeatedly cited in American
case law, it has been mentioned more often in the breach than in
the observance.
IV. AFTER 1787
A. Essential Rights
In the 1798 case of Calder v. Bull, Justice Chase described a
class of laws which "cannot be considered a rightful exercise of
legislative authority":
your breast. They would rob you of your property; threaten to burn your houses;
oblige you to be on your guard night and day; alarms spread from town to town;
families were broken up; the tender mother would cry, "0, my son is among them!
What shall I do for my child!" Some were taken captive, children taken out of their
schools, and carried away. Then we should hear of an action, and the poor prison-
ers were set in the front, to be killed by their own friends. How dreadful, how
distressing was this! Our distress was so great that we should have been glad to
snatch at any thing that looked like a government. Had any person, that was able
to protect us, come and set up his standard, we should all have flocked to it, even if
it had been.., a tyrant .... [Wihen I saw this Constitution, I found that it was a
cure for these disorders .... I got a copy of it, and read it over and over .... I did
not go to any lawyer, to ask his opinion; we have no lawyer in our town, and we do
well enough without. I formed my own opinion, and was pleased with this
Constitution.
Comments of Mr. Smith, 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 102--03 (J. Elliott ed., 1836). Farmer Smith was hardly
a member of the "propertied elite." Smith described himself as "a plain man, and get my
living by the plough." Id. at 102. Unlike Miller, Smith and those he called "my brother
ploughjoggers" did not have the luxury of ignoring the consequences of economic liberty-
or the lack of it.
lo9 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Note
also that the Constitution specifically preserved "[aill debts contracted and engagements
entered into, before the adoption of this Constitution." U.S. CONST. art. VI, §1. The Found-
ing generation's belief in the sanctity of debt and contract is reflected in Ware v. Hylton, in
which the Court held that the state of Virginia had no right to cancel debts owed to British
creditors before the Revolution. Justice Chase held that "the immutable principles of jus-
tice; the public faith of the states... the rights of the debtors.., all combine to prove, that
ample compensation ought to be made to all the debtors." 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 245 (1796).
Justice Paterson wrote "[c]onfiscation of debts is considered a disreputable thing among
civilized nations of the present day .... " Id. at 255. Also, Justice Wilson held that "[bly
every nation, whatever is its form of government, the confiscation of debts has long been
considered disreputable . . . ." Id. at 281. But see Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398, 416 (1934) (upholding the constitutionality of a Minnesota act which ex-
tended the due dates on property rental and mortgage payments).
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A law that punished a citizen for an innocent action, or, in other
words, for an act, which, when done, was in violation of no ex-
isting law; a law that destroys, or impairs, the lawful private
contracts of citizens; a law that makes a man a judge in his own
cause; or a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B. It is
against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legisla-
ture with such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed
that they have done it." °
The state and federal courts were in wide agreement on this
point. In another famous case, Corfield v. Coryell,"' Justice
Bushrod Washington wrote that there are certain "privileges and
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which be-
long, of right, to the citizens of all free governments. ."... 1112 These
"fundamental principles" were viewed as protections of certain ba-
sic rights, such as the right of "enjoyment of life and liberty ... the
right to acquire and possess property.., and to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as
the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the
whole," and the right "to pass through, or to reside in any other
state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, [or] professional
pursuits.""3
Between Corfield and the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases, there
are about sixty reported cases at both state and federal levels
which discussed this common law right."4 Sewall v. Jones"5 for
instance, held that "[s]tatutes which impose restrictions upon
trade or common occupations, or which levy an excise or tax upon
them, must be construed strictly.""' The 1829 case of Beall v.
Beck addressed whether a landlord or innkeeper had the right to
take possession of property, which in this case involved a slave left
behind by a boarder who had not paid his rent."7 The court said
that although the landlord had a privilege to retain a non-paying
guest's property, "[wiherever the privilege of the landlord would
destroy a lawful trade or occupation which is useful to the public,
it is restrained by law.""1
lio 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386, 388 (1798).
ill 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
112 Id. at 551.
113 Id. at 551-52.
114 See infra Appendix A for those cases not addressed in the text.
115 Sewall v. Jones, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 412 (Mass. 1830).
116 Id. at 414.
117 2 F. Cas. 1111, 1111 (C.C.D.C. 1829) (No. 1,161).
118 Id. at 1114. This legal preoccupation with protecting the individual's ability to earn
a living is also revealed by the decisions concerning public access to fishing or hunting
areas. In Peck v. Lockwood, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that at common law any-
one might take oysters from a stream, even if another person owned the soil surrounding
the stream; the landowner must show some right to exclusive fishing. 5 Day 22 (Conn.
1811). "[T]he right of fishing in such place where there is a flux and reflux of the sea, is a
right common to every citizen, although the soil be the estate of a particular person." Id. at
20031 225
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Some of the cases are historically intriguing. In City of Mem-
phis v. Winfield,"9 Justice Turley of the Tennessee Supreme Court
struck down an ordinance which required the city watchmen to
arrest, fine, or punish "all free negroes who might be found out
after ten o'clock."12 Given that this case arose in a southern court
in the 1840s, it is remarkable enough that the court struck down
the statute. The angry language which the court used to denounce
it is even more surprising: "This new curfew law . . . is high
handed and oppressive, and.., an attempt to impair the liberty of
a free person unnecessarily, to restrain him from the exercise of
his lawful pursuits, and to make an innocent act a crime... with-
out trial before any tribunal." 12' The court based its reasoning on
the fact that "very often, the most profitable employment is to be
found in the night," and therefore restraining free blacks from en-
gaging in meaningful employment was "both cruel and useless." 22
Earning a living ought not to be punished as if it were a "crime
against society" the court noted, since free people have a right to
earn a living as they can. 12
B. The Moral Dimension
We therefore discover a moral dimension to the common law
right to earn a living. A number of nineteenth century cases
which discussed this right would trace it to the Bible, where, in
Genesis, God tells Adam, "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat
bread, till thou return unto the ground."124 The Alabama Supreme
Court held in 1838 "that a citizen has the right to aspire to office,
or to pursue any lawful avocation," and no citizen should be "le-
gally deprived of this right, as a punishment for an offence com-
27. This reflects the general presumption against exclusivity in the pursuit of a lawful
occupation. "[A] man may have an exclusive privilege of fishing in an arm of the sea; but
such right is not to be presumed; it must be proved.. .. " Id. See also Warren v. Matthews,
91 Eng. Rep. 312, 312 (K.B. 1704); Carter v. Murcot, 98 Eng. Rep. 127, 127, 129 (K.B.
1768).
119 27 Tenn. (8 Hum.) 707 (Tenn. 1848).
120 Id. at 707.
121 Id. at 709.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 710.
124 Genesis 3:19 (King James). In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville noted
that "[e]very honest profession is honorable."
Among democratic peoples where there is no hereditary wealth, every man works
for his living, or has worked, or comes from parents who have worked. Everything
therefore prompts the assumption that to work is the necessary, natural, and hon-
est condition of all men.... As the desire for prosperity is universal, fortunes are
middling and ephemeral, and everyone needs to increase his resources or create
fresh ones for his children, all see quite clearly that it is profit which, if not wholly
then at least partially, prompts them to work.... In the United States professions
are more or less unpleasant, more or less lucrative, but they are never high or low.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 550-51 (J.P. Mayer ed. & G. Lawrence
trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1850).
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mitted, without a trial by jury."1 25 In 1850, the Georgia Supreme
Court held, in Mayor of Savannah v. Hartridge,'26 that "Statutes
which impose restrictions upon trade or common occupations, and
which levy an excise or tax upon them, must be construed
strictly."1 27 And the Supreme Court of Illinois held, in the 1855
case of Wade v. Halligan,2 s that "[tihere are lawful trades, which
are, nevertheless, treated as nuisances in particular places and
localities."1 29 The law should resist such restraints of trade, ex-
plained the court: judges should act with "an anxious view to pro-
tect all parties in their just rights, and the profitable.., pursuit of
their interests."13 ° Similarly, in Wynehamer v. People, the New
York Court of Appeals struck down an 1856 temperance law, not-
ing that although liquor might have pernicious effects, it was still
property, and selling it was therefore a legitimate occupation pro-
tected under the Constitution. 3 ' In short, as one author has
noted, "long before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
British and American courts protected many facets of the individ-
ual's right to pursue a gainful occupation against encroachment
by the government." 32
C. The Fourteenth Amendment
After the Civil War, in response to the Black Codes and Jim
Crow laws, the Federal Government sought new ways to protect
the former slaves from oppression by their own states. The inge-
nuity with which the Southern legislatures devised ways of "keep-
ing the black man in his social and legal place" is occasionally
125 In re Dorsey, 7 Port. 293, 368 (Ala. 1838).
126 8 Ga. 23 (Ga. 1850).
127 Id. at 30. See also Hall v. Ohio, 20 Ohio 8, 13 (1851) ("[S]tatutes which impose
restrictions on trade or common occupations must be construed strictly.") (quoting Sewall
v. Jones, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 412 (1830)).
128 16 Ill. 507 (Ill. 1855).
129 Id. at 512.
130 Id.
131 13 N.Y. 378, 385-86 (N.Y. 1856). A large number of the cases involving interfer-
ence with the right of livelihood concern temperance or prohibition laws. As one court put
it, however, such regulations are legitimate not in spite of the right of a liquor purveyor to
make his living in this fashion, but because "'[tlo sell intoxicating liquor at retail is not a
natural right to pursue an ordinary calling.'" Sherlock v. Stuart, 55 N.W. 845, 846 (Mich.
1893) (quoting BLACK, INTOX. LiQ. §§ 46, 48). But see Baker v. Beckwith, 29 Ohio St. 314,
319 (Ohio 1876) ("At common law, it was lawful to sell or give away intoxicating liquors,
and still continues so, except to the extent that the sale, or giving away, has been prohib-
ited by the statute."). In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), the Supreme Court upheld
restrictions on the sale of liquor against the challenge that it violated this common law
right, noting that because liquor caused a variety of moral and physical ills, it was properly
the subject of especially stringent controls. Id. at 660-63.
132 Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right of Livelihood,
82 Ky. L.J. 397, 399-400 (1993-94) [hereinafter McCormack, Economic].
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astonishing. 133 Among the laws which Congress passed to redress
these problems was the Civil Rights Act of 186613 and the Four-
teenth Amendment, the first section of which held in part that
"[nlo State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." 35
There is a good deal of dispute in the scholarly literature over
the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, but as Bernard Siegan wrote, "commentators
generally agree that [the Amendment] was intended to guarantee
and constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866. "136 That Act's
primary concern was the protection of economic rights for new
black citizens. It mentioned none of what courts later would call
"fundamental rights" (speech, travel, procreation, etc.), though it
did state that all "citizens, of every race and color, without regard
to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude...
shall have the same right.., to full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is en-
joyed by white citizens."" 7 It is noteworthy that the Congres-
sional Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, Senators Howard
and Trumbull for instance, referred to Justice Bushrod Washing-
ton's explanation of "privileges or immunities" in Corfield v. Cory-
ell when explaining this clause. 13 Representative John Bingham,
133 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 308 (1973). See also
Poindexter v. La. Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967) (detailing the
history of Louisiana's mechanisms for segregating public schools).
134 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1994)).
135 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
136 SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES, supra note 92, at 50. See also Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60, 78-79 (1917); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 317-18 (1879) (explaining the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866);
Kenyon D. Bunch, The Original Understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 10
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 321, 332 (2000) ("Most students of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause... agree on one point: the Privileges or Immunities Clause was meant to protect, in
some fashion, the freedoms enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Property and con-
tract rights, access to the courts and personal security were the principal concerns of the
Act."); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1389-90 (1992) ("Virtually everyone agrees that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was intended at least to empower Congress to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Most
students of history would go a bit further and say that the Amendment actually writes the
substance of the 1866 Act into the Constitution.").
137 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1994)).
138 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). See also CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. App. 69 (1871) (statement of Sen. Shellabarger); SOME ACCOUNT OF THE
WORK OF STEPHEN J. FIELD AS A LEGISLATOR, STATE JUDGE, AND JUDGE OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 124 (1881) ("[The Fourteenth Amendment] was intended to
make every one within the jurisdiction of the United States a free man, and as such to
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one of the authors of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, said
that the clause included "the liberty ... to work in an honest call-
ing and contribute by your toil in some sort to the support of your-
self, to the support of your fellowmen, and to be secure in the
enjoyment of the fruits of your toil."1 39
Senator John Sherman explained that courts interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause will
"look first at the Constitution of the United States as the primary
fountain of authority,"4 ° but also to the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, American and English history, and English common law,
where "they will find the fountain and reservoir of the rights of
American as well as English citizens.""' Representative Hamil-
ton asked:
[H] as not every person a right, to carry on his own occupation, to
secure the fruits of his own industry, and appropriate them as
best suits himself, as long as it is a legitimate exercise of this
right and not vicious in itself, or against public policy, or mor-
ally wrong, or against the natural rights of others?142
These statements are at least plausible support for the conclusion
of one federal court, that "it seems quite impossible that any defi-
nition of these terms [privileges and immunities] could be
adopted, or even seriously proposed, so narrow as to exclude the
right to labor for subsistence.""
The Fourteenth Amendment's protection of the right to earn a
living was part of the sublimated conflict that made up the Recon-
struction era. That conflict consisted largely of vengeful, pent-up
frustration, cultural chauvinism, and attempts by Southerners to
maintain to the last a firm hold on a social order which was "gone
with the wind." A good example is the case of Cummings v. Mis-
souri, which involved Missouri's constitutional requirement that
citizens take an oath of loyalty to the United States before engag-
ing in a profession."' Citizens were required to swear that they
had never "been in armed hostility to the United States, or to the
lawful authorities thereof," or had participated in the secessionist
cause in any way.'45 A person who refused to take this oath was
forbidden not just from holding "any office of honor, trust, or
allow him to pursue his happiness by the ordinary avocations of life upon the same terms
and conditions as others.").
139 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 86 (1871).
140 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 844 (1872).
141 Id.
142 1 CONG. REC. 363 (1874).
143 In re Parrott, 1 F. 481, 506 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880). See generally Trisha Olson, The
Natural Law Foundation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 48 ARK. L. REv. 347 (1995).
144 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 316-17 (1866).
145 Id. (quoting Mo. CONST.).
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profit" under state authority, but even from holding any position
in any corporation, teaching in private schools, or "holding any
real estate or other property in trust for the use of any church."146
In an opinion by Justice Field, the Supreme Court struck
down the state constitutional requirement, holding that "[t]he
oath could not.., have been required as a means of ascertaining
whether parties were qualified or not for their respective callings
or the trusts with which they were charged."1 47 The state had ar-
gued that the requirement did not deprive citizens of "life, liberty,
or property," but merely restrained them from working. Field re-
jected this contention. "The learned counsel does not use these
terms-life, liberty, and property-as comprehending every right
known to the law," he wrote. "He does not include under property
those estates which one may acquire in professions, though they
are often the source of the highest emoluments and honors....
Disqualification from the pursuits of a lawful avocation ... may
also, and often has been, imposed as punishment."14 s
The theory upon which our political institutions rest is, that all
men have certain inalienable rights-that among these are life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and that in the pursuit of
happiness all avocations, all honors, all positions, are alike open
to every one, and that in the protection of all these rights all are
equal before the law. Any deprivation or suspension of any of
these rights for past conduct is punishment, and can be in no
otherwise defined. 149
In an era in which such severe racial conflicts were leading to
statutory schemes for keeping individuals from pursuing happi-
ness, the importance of protecting the right to earn an honest liv-
ing could hardly be overestimated. In Ex parte Garland, which
like Cummings involved an oath that a person was required to
take before engaging in a lawful occupation, attorney Reverdy
Johnson put the point starkly:
[Tihe legislature undertakes to say to [the defendant], "You
shall no longer enjoy that right, unless you will swear that you
have not done the things stated in the oath which we require
you to take;".... Certainly, he is not obliged to take it. No man
146 Id. at 317 (quoting Mo. CONST.).
147 Id. at 320.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 321-22. Likewise, in Munn v. Illinois, Justice Field wrote:
By the term "liberty," as used in the [Fourteenth Amendment], something more is
meant than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It
means freedom to go where one may choose, and to act in such manner, not incon-
sistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promo-
tion of his happiness; that is, to pursue such callings and avocations as may be
most suitable to develop his capacities, and give to them their highest enjoyment.
94 U.S. 113, 142 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting).
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is obliged to follow his occupation; but unless he takes it he
must starve, except he have other means of living."150
Thus by 1870, when the cases which eventually became the
Slaughter-House Cases were being heard in lower federal courts,
Circuit Justice Bradley could write:
[I]t is one of the privileges of every American citizen to adopt
and follow such lawful industrial pursuit-not injurious to the
community-as he may see fit, without unreasonable regulation
or molestation, and without being restricted by any of those un-
just, oppressive, and odious monopolies or exclusive privileges
which have been condemned by all free governments .... These
privileges cannot be invaded without sapping the very founda-
tions of republican government .... [Any government which
deprives its citizens of the right to engage in any lawful pursuit,
subject only to reasonable restrictions, or at least subject only to
such restrictions as are reasonably within the power of govern-
ment to impose,-is tyrannical and unrepublican. And if to en-
force arbitrary restrictions made for the benefit of a favored few,
it takes away and destroys the citizen's property without trial or
condemnation, it is guilty of violating all the fundamental privi-
leges to which I have referred, and one of the fundamental prin-
ciples of free government." 1
V. THE Slaughter-House Cases
A. The Louisiana Monopoly
Federal determination to protect the right to earn a living
was soon crippled, however, with the Slaughter-House Cases,
which questioned the constitutionality of a Louisiana law grant-
ing a twenty-five year monopoly to a state butchery company.152
Any cattle brought to New Orleans and several surrounding coun-
ties could only be slaughtered in the facilities run by this com-
pany-effectively outlawing private slaughterhouses. 15 3
15o Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 370 (1866).
151 Live-stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408). Likewise, in State ex
rel. Belden v. Fagan, another case arising out of the Louisiana butchery regulations, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana held:
[Wihile for sanitary reasons, [the state legislature] had the right to compel the
butchers to abandon the locality where their slaughterhouses are situated ... im-
posing this limitation upon their natural rights for the public good, justifiable only
by the necessity, it had not the right to create this monopoly in favor of the
Slaughterhouse Company .... It had no right to place unnecessary restrictions
upon labor, to compel the numerous persons pursuing the occupation of butchers
to repair to the premises of the Slaughterhouse Company and there pay tribute to
it for the privilege of pursuing their usual occupation or earning their living.
22 La. Ann. 545, 559 (La. 1870).
152 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 66 (1873).
153 Id. at 59-60. The Slaughter-House Cases contrast sharply with an English case,
Pierce v. Bartrum, which upheld a regulation prohibiting any slaughtering within the walls
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The proponents of the law claimed it was enacted to protect
public health and safety, just as the proponents of the regulation
of upholsterers in Allen v. Tooley, or of tailors in Davenant v.
Hurdis. The private butchers sued, on the grounds that the law
violated their right to pursue a lawful occupation, a right pro-
tected by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; however, in a five to four decision, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Louisiana law.' Justice
Miller, writing for the majority, declared that it was "difficult to
see a justification for the assertion that the butchers are deprived
of the right to labor in their occupation," because the law did not
forbid butchers from slaughtering cattle themselves in the state
corporation's slaughterhouses; a private butcher was free "to
slaughter, to prepare, and to sell his own meats; but he is required
to slaughter at a specified place and to pay a reasonable compen-
sation for the use of the accommodations furnished him at that
place."'55 Miller thus considered the Louisiana statute as nothing
more than a legitimate health regulation. Peter Irons wrote, how-
ever, that "[a]s they had in 1810, when they ignored evidence of
corruption in the Yazoo land grants, the justices shut their noses
to the stench of bribery in the Slaughterhouse Cases.""6
Miller held that Coke's Case of Monopolies was inapposite.
Monopolies in England, he held, had been outlawed because they
were conveyed by the king, against the will of the people.'57 A leg-
islature, however, represented the will of the people. "It may,
therefore, be considered as established, that the authority of the
legislature of Louisiana to pass the present statute is ample, un-
less some restraint in the exercise of that power be found in the
Constitution of that state or in the amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the United States . "..."158 In other words, whatever the
legislature passed was legitimate, unless the legislature was spe-
cifically prohibited from acting in that regard. Even if such a
of the city of Exeter. Pierce, 98 Eng. Rep. 1080 (K.B. 1775). The regulation was challenged
as being in restraint of trade, but the court, while scrutinizing the regulation to protect the
right to earn a living, upheld it as a reasonable health and safety regulation. Unlike the
law in the Slaughter-House Cases, Pierce did not establish a monopoly by requiring all
butchers to do their work at a particular butcher-shop.
154 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 66, 83.
155 Id. at 61. In Noe v. Morristown, the Tennessee Supreme Court emphasized this
fact:
We are referred to the Slaughterhouse Case as an authority in support of such a
monopoly. That case does hold that it was within the power of the Legislature of
the state of Louisiana to establish such a monopoly as to the place where the
slaughter was to be done, but distinctly pointed out that at that place everybody
was permitted to do their own slaughtering, and the company in charge of the
place was bound under heavy penalties to permit them.
161 S.W. 485, 486 (Tenn. 1913) (internal citations omitted).
156 PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 199 (1999).
157 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 66, 66.
158 Id.
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"blank-check view" of state power was appropriate at the state
level, the question was equally whether the federal Constitution
prohibited the state from establishing such a monopoly. Miller re-
jected the claim that the privileges or immunities clause was in-
tended to protect citizens against the legislatures of their own
states: The clause "speaks only of privileges and immunities of cit-
izens of the United States, and does not speak of those of citizens
of the several states .... [Tihe latter, whatever they may be, are
not intended to have any additional protection by this paragraph
of the Amendment."15 9
Justice Stephen Field, in a famous dissent, reviewed the his-
tory of monopoly practices. At the time of the Revolution, Field
wrote that the right of "every free subject.., to pursue his happi-
ness by following any of the known established trades" was among
the most cherished principles in English law.'
This equality of right, with exemption from all disparaging and
partial enactments, in the lawful pursuits of life, throughout the
whole country, is the distinguishing privilege of citizens of the
United States. To them, everywhere, all pursuits, all profes-
sions, all avocations are open without other restrictions than
such as are imposed equally upon all others of the same age, sex
and condition. The state may prescribe such regulations for
every pursuit and calling of life as will promote the public
health, secure the good order and advance the general prosper-
ity of society, but when once prescribed, the pursuit or calling
must be free to be followed by every citizen who is within the
conditions designated, and will conform to the regulations. This
is the fundamental idea upon which our institutions rest, and
unless adhered to in the legislation of the country our govern-
ment will be a Republic only in name. 6 '
It is neither necessary nor possible to fully discuss the aspects
of the Slaughter-House Cases here; other commentators have writ-
ten very extensively about the subject, 162 and as Justice Thomas
recently said, they have agreed on little except that the Slaughter-
House Cases' interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause was wrong.'63 But it is pertinent to note a few things about
the case. First, the holding, which Robert Bork has praised as "a
narrow victory for judicial moderation" because it allowed the cor-
159 Id. at 74.
160 Id. at 105.
161 Id. at 109-10.
162 See, e.g., JOHN E. SEMONCHE, KEEPING THE FAITH: A CULTuRAL HISTORY OF THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT 325-26 (1998); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTITUTION
68-71 (1987); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 79 (1993); Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviving the
Privileges Or Immunities Clause to Redress the Balance Among States, Individuals, and the
Federal Government, 3 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 1, 27-48 (1998).
163 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 522 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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ruption of the Louisiana legislature to proceed unchecked by judi-
cial interference-did not escape controversy in its own time.1
4
More importantly, the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases did
not deny that the right to earn an honest living was, indeed, a
common law right; rather, the majority implicitly agreed that it
was, and merely held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
was not meant to protect that right, at a federal level, against
state encroachments.'65 Third, the majority held that the Louisi-
ana statute had not actually violated that right. 6 '
Thus, the Slaughter-House Cases did not actually hold that
state monopolies could never violate such a right, or that such a
right did not exist. In fact, the Court increasingly began to ob-
serve the validity and importance of that right. The subsequent
era of "economic substantive due process" has been charted well
enough by Bernard Siegan,167 but it is important to note that by
1888, the Court's majority in Powell v. Pennsylvania would con-
clude as correct that one's "enjoyment upon terms of equality with
all others in similar circumstances of the privilege of pursuing an
ordinary calling or trade, and of acquiring, holding, and selling
property, is an essential part of his rights of liberty and property
as guarantied by the fourteenth amendment .... ,,16' The Slaugh-
ter-House Cases were truly an example of the age-old tension be-
tween legitimate business regulation and the wrongful restraint
of liberty. As economic regulation became more prevalent from
the turn of the century to the present, the courts were increasingly
called upon to resolve this tension.
B. The Impact of the Slaughter-House Cases
Lawrence Friedman described the emergence of protectionist
economic measures disguised as health and safety regulations
during the post-Civil War era: "[O]ccupational licensing ... abso-
lutely burgeoned in this period," and while some of these regula-
tions were "solely designed to produce revenue," others were
164 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAw 39 (1990). The Slaughter-House Cases was one of what became a string of cases un-
dermining the Civil War Amendments in the post-Civil War decades. In United States v.
Cruikshank, the Court, relying on the Slaughter-House Cases, held that the Fourteenth
Amendment gave Congress no power to stop southern states from tacitly aiding in the mass
murder of former slaves, because the right to life is a right incident to state, and not fed-
eral, citizenship. 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1875). See also Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights
and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2113,
2151-60 (1993). Such scandalously bad law prevailed, however, culminating in the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), in which the
Court, by applying "judicial restraint," refused to block southern majorities from obliterat-
ing the Reconstruction commitment to civil rights.
165 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78-80 (1873).
166 Id. at 78, 83.
167 See generally SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES, supra note 92.
168 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888).
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discriminatory defensive measures meant to exclude outside
merchants from the local market.'69 Licensing was first required
for the "learned" professions, especially those concerned with
health issues, like dentistry or pharmacy, because it was easier to
make the argument that these practices should be regulated for
public safety purposes. 7 ' Licensing requirements were subse-
quently broadened to include architecture, midwifery, mining, and
blacksmithing."' While the state justified such licensing laws as
safeguards for the public's health and safety, the true motivation
was often to stifle competition within a given trade or occupa-
tion.172 As Friedman believed, "[tihe [licensing] argument was
quite obvious in the case of doctors .... For barbers, the argu-
ment was a trifle strained; and for horseshoers, fairly
desperate."'73
In 1889 the Michigan Supreme Court summarized the nega-
tive effects of this phenomenon:
It is quite common in these later days for certain classes of citi-
zens-those engaged in this or that business-to appeal to the
government-national, state, or municipal-to aid them by leg-
islation against another class of citizens engaged in the same
business, but in some other way. This class legislation, when
indulged in, seldom benefits the general public, but nearly al-
ways aids the few for whose benefit it is enacted, not only at the
expense of the few against whom it is ostensibly directed, but
also at the expense and to the detriment of the many, for whose
benefit all legislation should be, in a republican form of govern-
ment, framed and devised. This kind of legislation should re-
ceive no encouragement at the hands of the courts ....
In a well-known case, Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City
Co., Justice Field wrote that monopolies violated the common law
because:
[T]hey destroy the freedom of trade, discourage labor and indus-
try, restrain persons from getting an honest livelihood, and put
it in the power of the grantees to enhance the price of commodi-
ties. They are void because they interfere with the liberty of the
individual to pursue a lawful trade or employment. 175
The court shunned the granting of monopoly power to a corpora-
tion or specific class of business, notwithstanding the state's rec-
169 FRIEDMAN, supra note 133, at 397 (emphasis deleted). See also Lawrence M. Fried-
man, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910: A Legal and Social
Study, 53 CAL. L. REV. 487 (1965).
170 Id. at 397-99.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 399.
173 Id. at 399-400.
174 Chaddock v. Day, 42 N.W. 977, 978 (Mich. 1889).
175 111 U.S. 746, 756 (1884) (Field, J., concurring).
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ognized right to limit or prevent undesirable nuisances resulting
from the operation of certain types of businesses.' 6 In Dent v.
West Virginia, the Supreme Court definitively described the "right
of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling,
business, or profession he may choose," for the right to earn a liv-
ing, said the Court, was a property right, one which is "often of
great value to the possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily taken from
them.1 77
State cases also enunciated this principle, holding that
"[statutes which impose restrictions upon trade or common occu-
pations, or which levy an excise or tax upon them, must be strictly
construed." 78 In these cases, the question before the court was as
follows: "Is the act in question an arbitrary interference with the
right of contract, and is there no reasonable ground upon which
the legislature, acting within its conceded powers, could pass such
a law?" 7 9 In other words, is the challenged regulation of business
a legitimate exercise of the state's power to prevent public nui-
sances-or was that merely a guise for monopolistic practices, lim-
iting the right of the individual to pursue a lawful calling? That
analysis often required the Court to look beyond the facial expla-
nation of the law. These cases, which today are referred to as the
"economic substantive due process" cases, were substantive due
process cases in the sense that they examined the substance of
legislation to determine if the legislature, "under the pretext of
executing its powers, [had] pass[ed] laws for the accomplishment
of objects not entrusted to the government," when it would then
"become the painful duty of this tribunal ... to say that such an
act was not the law of the land."180 To discover such a pretext re-
quires the court to examine the substance of legislation, and not
merely the procedures by which it was promulgated.'' One of the
176 Id. at 749-53.
177 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889). Note that the Court here, at the height of the laissez-
faire era, which allegedly proscribed legislative attempts to protect consumers and society,
nevertheless concluded [bI ut there is no arbitrary deprivation of such right where its exer-
cise is not permitted because of a failure to comply with conditions imposed by the state for
the protection of society." Id. at 122.
178 Memphis v. Bing, 30 S.W. 745, 746 (Tenn. 1895). See also Merced County v. Helm
& Nolan, 36 P. 399, 400 (Cal. 1894) (holding that business license taxes must be strictly
construed); Washington Electric Vehicle Transp. Co. v. District of Columbia, 19 App. D.C.
462, 470 (D.C. 1902); Mace v. Buchanan, 52 S.W. 505, 507 (Tenn. 1899); Combined Saw and
Planer Co. v. Flournoy, 14 S.E. 976, 977 (Va. 1892); State v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 23
N.W. 871, 875 (Wis. 1885). See also infra Appendix B.
179 McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 548 (1909).
1so McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
181 In Cummings v. Missouri, Justice Field penned perhaps the most succinct defense
of substantive due process ever. 71 U.S. 277, 325 (1866). He wrote:
The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows. Its inhibition was leveled at
the thing, not the name. It intended that the rights of the citizen should be secure
against deprivation for past conduct by legislative enactment, under any form,
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most famous of these "economic substantive due process" cases-
which is not often referred to as such-is Yick Wo v. Hopkins.1
2
Hopkins involved a statute which regulated Chinese laun-
dries in San Francisco. Laundries were not permitted to be housed
in wooden structures, and they were required to be licensed by a
board of supervisors. 8 3 Although the legislature justified the stat-
ute as necessary to protect public health and safety, the Supreme
Court found that the regulation was actually part of a statutory
scheme of discrimination against Chinese immigrants, whose
laundry cleaning businesses were generally made of wood. In fact,
nearly all of the laundries in the city were made of wood, as were
most residences." 4 Why then, did the regulation affect only laun-
dries? And were wooden laundry facilities really more dangerous
than those made of stone? "We are.., constrained, at the outset,"
the Supreme Court said, "to differ from the Supreme Court of Cal-
ifornia upon the real meaning of the ordinances in question."8 5
The statute was not a means of protecting society; instead it
vested the board of supervisors with "a naked and arbitrary power
to give or withhold" a business license." 6 The statute was a sort of
"Jim Crow law," a disguised attempt to infringe on the rights of
Chinese immigrants to freely earn a living.
[T]he very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life,
or the means of living, or any material right essential to the en-
joyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolera-
ble in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence
of slavery itself.' 7
Just as literacy tests for voting had been used in the South under
the pretext of ensuring an educated electorate-though actually
used to keep former slaves from voting-so this law, supposedly
regulating businesses for safety's sake, was in fact a pretextual
attempt to exclude Chinese workers from the marketplace.
however disguised. If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of the enactment,
its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and futile proceeding.
Id. See also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1877) ("[Clan a State make any-
thing due process of law which, by its own legislation, it chooses to declare such? To affirm
this is to hold that the prohibition to the States is of no avail . . . ."); John C. Eastman &
Timothy Sandefur, Stephen Field: Frontier Justice or Justice on the Natural Rights Fron-
tier?, 6 NEXUS 121 (2001) (reviewing Field's views on the right to earn a living).
182 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See also In re Parrott, 1 F. 481, 520 (D. Cal. 1880) (striking
down law prohibiting the hiring of Chinese); Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534, 535, 580
(Cal. 1862) (striking down tax on Chinese laborers as unconstitutional).
183 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 366.
184 Id. at 368.
185 Id. at 366.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 370.
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Yick Wo was one of a number of economic liberty cases which
protected the right to earn a living on equal protection grounds.
In an 1875 case, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that:
If one of the citizens of Chicago is permitted to engage in the
business of slaughtering animals in a certain locality, an ordi-
nance which would prevent, under a penalty, another from en-
gaging in the same business, would not only be unreasonable,
and, for that reason, void, but its direct tendency would be to
create a monopoly, which the law will not tolerate.1
88
After quoting Justice Field's opinion in Butcher's Union, an 1891
Colorado appellate court similarly explained that any law which
allows one individual to pursue a vocation while excluding an-
other from the same business effectively nullifies the fundamental
right of United States citizens to pursue any lawful calling' 89
In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, the Court reiterated that the "'the
right to follow any of the ordinary callings of life-is one of the
privileges of a citizen of the United States,"' 190 and that this right
was one of the "rights which are covered by the word 'liberty' as
contained in the 14th Amendment."' 9' Yet again the Court re-
peated that the pursuit of a lawful occupation could be subjected
to legitimate licensing restrictions for the protection of the pub-
lic-but such regulations should not be disguised restrictions on
individual freedom. With this standard in mind, the Court left
open the question of professional licensing, explaining it should be
determined on a fact-specific basis.'92
Given this background, the "notorious" case of Lochner v. New
York' 9' seems much less arbitrary and scandalous than it is usu-
ally described in the scholarly literature. Lochner involved a stat-
ute which regulated the number of hours that bakers could
work. 9 ' This law was a protectionist measure, pushed through
the legislature by larger bakery companies which primarily relied
upon machinery.'95 The statute thus limited the smaller bakeries'
ability to effectively compete, as they were more reliant on human
labor. 196 As one author explained, "[w]ere such a result achieved
by private contract, it would violate the antitrust laws."'97 It is
ironic that such laws are often described as beneficial to the less
188 Tugman v. Chicago, 78 Ill. 405, 409 (Ill. 1875).
189 May v. People, 27 P. 1010, 1012 (Colo. Ct. App. 1891).
i9o 165 U.S. 578, 590 (1897) (quoting Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111
U.S. 746, 764 (1884)).
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
194 Id. at 64.
195 Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgment, and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter and the
Mistranslation of the Due Process Clause, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 3, 42-43 (1999).
196 See Meese, supra note 195, at 42-43.
197 Id.
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powerful. To put the point simply, you cannot make people richer
by making their jobs illegal.19
Although the legislature claimed that the statute was a
health and safety regulation, the Court did not blithely accept this
purported explanation. Rather, it looked into the real substance
of the law and concluded that the statute unconstitutionally inter-
fered with the freedom of contract between employer and em-
ployee, while bearing little relationship to employee health and
safety.199
Lochner is generally cited as the ultimate point of hubris in
the career of a Court run wild on newfangled laissez-faire eco-
nomic theory. In reality, it was the continuation of a legal theory
whose roots went back for centuries. °° It was followed by a num-
ber of high profile cases striking down economic regulations. In
Adair v. United States, the Supreme Court struck down a law
which made it illegal to discriminate against employees who were
not members of a labor union. 0 1 The liberty clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment "embrace[s] the right to make contracts for
the purchase of the labor of others ...., In Truax v. Raich, the
Court struck down an Arizona statute which prohibited compa-
nies from employing more than twenty percent non-citizens.0 3 In
this rerun of Yick Wo, the Court said that "[tihe right to earn a
livelihood and to continue in employment unmolested by efforts to
enforce void enactments should similarly be entitled to protection
in the absence of adequate remedy at law."20 4 Just as the statutes
in Yick Wo and Lochner were defended as health-and-safety mea-
198 Id.
199 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
200 See, e.g., In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 115 (N.Y. 1885).
When a health law is challenged in the courts as unconstitutional on the ground
that it arbitrarily interferes with personal liberty and private property without
due process of law, the courts must be able to see that it has at least in fact some
relation to the public health, that the public health is the end actually aimed at,
and that it is appropriate and adapted to that end. This we have not been able to
see in this law, and we must, therefore, pronounce it unconstitutional and void.
Id. The myth that Lochner announced a 'new" and "unprecedented" rule has long deserved
debunking. The reader will find a list of cases predating Lochner, with holdings identical
to those the Court reached-that the Court must look behind the scenes of a police power
regulation which infringes on economic rights. See infra Appendix B.
201 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908).
202 Id. at 172.
203 239 U.S. 33, 38 (1915). See also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 334-35 (1921).
The Fourteenth Amendment... intended.., that all persons should be equally
entitled to pursue their happiness and acquire and enjoy property . . .that no
impediment should be interposed to the pursuits of any one except as applied to
the same pursuits by others under like circumstances; that no greater burdens
should be laid upon one than are laid on others in the same calling and condition
Id. at 334-35 (quoting Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885)).
204 239 U.S. at 38.
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sures, so too was the law in Truax. °5 Nevertheless, while the leg-
islature may act to protect health and safety, the Court held such
measures unconstitutional when they go beyond that point and
deny people the "ordinary means of earning a livelihood. It re-
quires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in
the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of
the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of
the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure."206
The rule that impositions on the common law right of liveli-
hood should be strictly construed was also maintained at the state
level during this period.207 Economic substantive due process was
a means by which the real effect of a regulation of private con-
tracts could be analyzed to see whether it was really a legitimate
exercise of police power, or a protectionistic or monopolistic
scheme. As the Court explained in Adams v. Tanner, °8 the mere
potential for abuse within a given profession does not justify com-
plete removal of one's right to pursue that profession.209 "Happily
for all, the fundamental guaranties of the Constitution cannot be
freely submerged if and whenever some ostensible justification is
advanced and the police power invoked." 21
This was the backdrop for the famous pre-New Deal cases. In
United States v. Butler, the Supreme Court struck down a New
Deal statute called the Agriculture Adjustment Act, which re-
quired "processors" of crops-mill owners, for instance-to pay a
tax, thus generating revenue to be turned over to farmers. 211 The
plaintiffs sued, and the government responded that this was only
a tax system, and therefore Constitutional under the provision for
"lay[ing] and collect[ing] taxes" as well as protecting the "general
205 Id. at 41. This, of course, began the notorious era of economic substantive due pro-
cess and "rampant laissez-faire," and the cases are more prevalent during this period. See
infra Appendix C.
206 Id.
207 See infra Appendix D.
208 244 U.S. 590 (1917).
209 Id. at 594-95. See also Commonwealth v. Fowler, 28 S.W. 786, 787 (Ky. 1894).
Every one has the right to follow an innocent calling without permission from the
government. He may do with his own whatsoever he pleases, so that he injure no
one else. We agree with learned counsel that 'the doctrine of legislative permis-
sion, as a condition precedent to the conduct of any useful or harmless business, is
grossly repugnant to those obvious principles of human right which lie at the foun-
dation of just government among men." So, then, without governmental interfer-
ence or consent, the farmer may till his soil, the merchant may buy and sell, the
lawyer and the doctor practice their professions, and the druggist and pharmacist
compound their medicines. And if, by reason of shysters and quacks, an injured
people demand protection, or if, because ill-behaved druggists or pretended phar-
macists debauch the public morals by dealing out intoxicating liquors and nos-
trums as beverages, yet the pursuit of these callings cannot be prohibited.
Id.
21o Adams, 244 U.S. at 594-95.
211 297 U.S. 1, 54-56, 78 (1936).
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welfare."212 The Supreme Court found the statute unconstitu-
tional, determining that the government's justification of the stat-
ute as a tax measure was merely a disguise: "The tax can only be
sustained by ignoring the avowed purpose and operation of the
act."213 Just as in Yick Wo and Truax, the Court refused to blindly
accept the government's justification of the law. "It is an estab-
lished principle that the attainment of a prohibited end may not
be accomplished under the pretext of the exertion of powers which
are granted."214
VI. ECONOMIC SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND ITS ENEMIES
I have quoted these cases at such length because they demon-
strate the fragility of the prevailing interpretation of the pre-New
Deal courts. Under the prevailing interpretation, the court struck
down government intervention in the economy because such laws
ran contrary to the Supreme Court Justices' personal economic
views, which they then wrongfully enforced from the bench.
These "economic substantive due process" cases were thus a con-
coction of the bourgeoisie in its effort to suppress and exploit the
proletariat. According to Arthur S. Miller, "a complaisant Su-
preme Court that was a de facto arm of the capital-owning
class.... invented, through a flash of revelation known only to
them, the notion that due process of law had a substantive dimen-
sion, and thereby protected corporations against social
legislation."215
Upon closer inspection, however, it seems odd to call any of
these decisions "economic substantive due process," since the
Court did not address economic concerns or apply any law-and-
economics methodology. Similarly, the Court did not rely on eco-
nomics when striking down the New Deal statutes. For instance,
in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, a minimum wage law that only
applied to females had the potential to cause the replacement of
female workers by males, since males were not covered by the
212 Id. at 64. Until the New Deal, there was broad consensus among American jurists
that, as Justice Chase put it in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387 (1798) ("[A] law that
takes property from A. and gives it to B.... is against all reason and justice."). See also
Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. ( 2 Pet.) 627, 657-58 (1829) ("We know of no case in which a
legislative Act to transfer the property of A to B without his consent has ever been held a
constitutional exercise of legislative power in any State of the Union."); Goshen v. Ston-
ington, 4 Conn. 209, 221 (Conn. 1822) ("If, for example, the legislature should enact a law,
without any assignable reason, taking from A. his estate, and giving it to B., the injustice
would be flagrant, and the act would produce a sensation of universal insecurity."); Taylor
v. Porter & Ford, 4 Hill 140, 143 (N.Y. 1843) ("The property of A. is taken, without his
permission, and transferred to B. Can such a thing be rightfully done? Has the legislature
any power to say it may be done?").
213 Butler, 297 U.S. at 58.
214 Id. at 68.
215 Miller, Pretense, supra note 108, at 390.
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statute and were therefore cheaper to employ.216 Congress justi-
fied the law as an attempt to protect women's "health and
morals."21 In an opinion by Justice Sutherland, the Court struck
down the law, not only for its unequal treatment, but also for its
infringement on the right of a woman to be employed as she sees
fit: "That the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the
liberty of the individual protected by this clause is settled by the
decisions of this court and is no longer open to question."218
Indeed, the law in Adkins fits precisely the description of sex-
ist paternalism provided by none other than Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg. Such laws were "apparently designed to benefit or pro-
tect women [but] could often, perversely, have the opposite ef-
fect."219 Such legislation was "ostensibly to shield or favor the sex
regarded as fairer but weaker, and dependent-prone," but was in
fact "premised on the notion that women could not cope with the
world beyond hearth and home without a father, husband, or big
brother to guide them."2 0 Some defenders of the legislation in Ad-
kins explicitly embraced such paternalism. Roscoe Pound, for in-
stance, explained that the individual should have no right "by
contract [to] impose[ ] substantial restraints upon his liberty," be-
cause "[fIreedom to impose restraints, in the hands of the weak
and necessitous, defeats the very end of liberty."221 In other
words, the poor could not be trusted with the right to decide for
themselves the number of hours, or for how much pay, they
wished to work.
In any case, just like the statute in Lochner, the minimum
wage law in Adkins had nothing to do with health and safety;
rather, both statutes were protectionist economic measures meant
to benefit politically-favored classes by restricting the freedom of
others to compete.
It is not a law dealing with any business charged with a public
interest or with public work, or to meet and tide over a tempo-
rary emergency. It has nothing to do with the character, meth-
ods or periods of wage payments. It does not prescribe hours of
labor or conditions under which labor is to be done. It is not for
the protection of persons under legal disability or for the preven-
tion of fraud. It is simply and exclusively a price-fixing law, con-
fined to adult women (for we are not now considering the
216 261 U.S. 525, 554-60 (1923).
217 Id. at 555.
218 Id. at 545.
219 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a Means
of Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV.
263, 269 (1997).
220 Id. at 269-70.
221 Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 484 (1909).
[Vol. 6:207
The Right to Earn a Living
provisions relating to minors), who are legally as capable of con-
tracting for themselves as men.222
As Hadley Arkes points out, Sutherland nowhere used any eco-
nomic arguments in the opinion. "There were no ventures into the
theories of monetarism or fiscal policy with the manipulation of
aggregate demand and 'multipliers.' There was not even a feint
toward theories of price and the supply of labor."221 Instead, Suth-
erland was "offering nothing less than a moral instruction .. .
[and] was settling the case in terms that were as purely jural as
an opinion could be.... Sutherland and his colleagues would find,
in the contrivances of the New Deal, arrangements that offended,
deeply, the principles of lawfulness."224 They offended the right of
the individual to use her land, her property, or her talents as she
saw fit.
Cases like Adkins, Yick Wo, and Lochner may have been "sub-
stantive due process" cases, but were not examples of "judicial ac-
tivism." They were examples of the court restraining legislative
activism which abridged the right to earn a living; a right with at
least seven hundred years of traditional protection behind it. We
may measure the political origins of the modern hostility toward
these decisions by one bitter comment made in an attack on Ad-
kins published shortly after it came down. "From somewhere or
other Mr. Justice Sutherland derives the constitutional doctrine
[that] . . . 'freedom of contract is, nevertheless, the general rule
and restraint the exception,"' wrote the commentator. 225 But "[n]o
such doctrine is stated in the Constitution .... [Riegulation has
long since become the rule, and freedom the exception. Whence,
then, comes the rule that Mr. Justice Sutherland reveals? Need-
less to say, it comes from Mr. Justice Sutherland."226
This is a backwards interpretation of the Constitution. In
wording similar to the Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amend-
222 Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 554 (1923). Yet again, the straw man
accusation-that the Adkins Court was defending "unlimited freedom of contract"-is be-
lied by Sutherland's own words: "There is, of course, no such thing as absolute freedom of
contract." Id. at 546.
The liberty of the individual to do as he pleases, even in innocent matters, is not
absolute. It must frequently yield to the common good .... But, nevertheless,
there are limits to the power, and, when these have been passed, it becomes the
plain duty of the courts in the proper exercise of their authority to so declare. To
sustain the individual freedom of action contemplated by the Constitution is not to
strike down the common good, but to exalt it; for surely the good of society as a
whole cannot be better served than by the preservation against arbitrary restraint
of the liberties of its constituent members.
Id. at 561.
223 HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND 78 (1994).
224 Id. at 79, 82.
225 Thomas Reed Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum Wage Legislation, 37 HARv. L.
REV. 545, 555 (1924) (quoting Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923)).
226 Id.
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ment reads, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."227 In logical sequence,
this means that the individual possesses life, liberty, and property
to begin with, and that he may be deprived of it subsequently, only
when due process standards are met. In other words, freedom is
the rule, and government action is the exception. 22 But reversing
this order-and then denouncing the original order as the concoc-
tion of a capitalist cabal on the federal bench-was imperative to
establishing the regulatory welfare state.
To ratify the extreme sorts of regulation which made up the
New Deal, it was necessary to overcome the presumption of lib-
erty, or to deny its existence. When the Court finally gave in to
New Deal pressures in the famous "Switch in Time That Saved
Nine," and held that courts should defer almost entirely to legisla-
tive economic regulations, it was in fact reversing the old rule that
the common law "is always jealous of its own importance; and re-
quires every statute which invades its authority to be carefully
watched and strictly construed."229 In United States v. Carolene
Products Co., most famous for its fourth footnote, the Court re-
versed this completely, holding:
Even in the absence of [evidentiary] aids, the existence of facts
supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regu-
latory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is
not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the
facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character
as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.23 °
227 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
228 See also Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, in THE SUPREME COURT AND
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 157, 186-94 (Bradford P. Wilson & Ken Masugi eds., 1998)
(explaining the "presumption of liberty"); James Madison, Charters, reprinted in JAMES
MADISON: WRITINGS 502, 502 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) ("In Europe, charters of liberty
have been granted by power. America has set the example and France has followed it, of
charters of power granted by liberty.").
229 Lessee of Brewer v. Blougher, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 178, 185 (1840) (Argument of Mr.
Pigman, for Plaintiff).
230 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). Although throughout this paper I refer to Carolene Prod-
ucts in particular, I do so only as shorthand, because the case was only one of a trio of cases
which announced the new epoch in Constitutional law brought on by the New Deal. The
other two were NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), which expanded
Congress' Commerce Clause power, and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937),
which upheld minimum wage legislation. Thus, I refer to this shift as occurring in 1937
even though Carolene Products was announced on April 25, 1938. Moreover, I do so while
acknowledging that the expansion of economic regulation did not begin suddenly in 1937,
but gradually over the course of the preceding half-century, with its Populist and Progres-
sive movements. Nevertheless, as Samuel R. Olken puts it, while the "Switch In Time That
Saved Nine" model of legal history is "overly simplistic," it remains true that "a fairly com-
plete transformation in constitutional thought occurred" in the 1920s and 30s, during
which "an emerging majority of Supreme Court Justices adapted constitutional provisions
to changing economic and social conditions." Samuel R. Olken, Historical Revisionism and
Constitutional Change: Understanding the New Deal Court, 88 VA. L. REV. 265, 278 (2002)
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Saying that economic regulations would bear such a strong
presumption of constitutionality, the Court split individual rights
into "fundamental" rights and "economic" rights. Yet, as genera-
tions before had understood, the two cannot be separated. The
"economic right" to run a business had never been based only on
economic justifications; it was the right of a person to act and pro-
vide for himself or his family. The spurious nature of Carolene
Products' dichotomy has been sufficiently demonstrated else-
where, 231' but it is remarkable how, after 1937, the Courts' treat-
ment of the right to earn an honest living has been confused.
Among the reasons for this confusion is the frequently articu-
lated premise with which we began this article: that the economic
liberty cases lacked historical foundation, and that there was no
such thing as the right to earn a living. The rise of Progressiv-
ism,232 and in particular, of legal positivism, led by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Louis Brandeis, and others, was the first time that the
very existence of such a right was to be directly challenged. In
McAuliffe v. New Bedford,2 3 Holmes wrote, "[tihe petitioner may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman."234 This is strictly correct, since the
common law guarantees only the right to work, not the right to be
hired, but Holmes's dictum, as Justice William Douglas would
later write, "ha[d] pernicious implications,"235 and was generally
taken to be a denigration of the common law right to seek employ-
ment. Holmes denied that the right to earn a living was protected
by the Constitution ostensibly because he denied that the Consti-
tution was based on an economic theory. But one contemporary
admirer of Holmes got closer to the truth-that Holmes was re-
writing the Constitution:
Justice Holmes came to the bench in 1882, when the transition
from individualism to collectivism in England was in pro-
gress.... [He] was too learned in the history of the law to be
(reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000)). See also
Barry Cushman, Lost Fidelities, 41 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 95 (1999) (providing a much
more balanced assessment of the history of the "Switch In Time That Saved Nine"). Still,
compared to the period from 1215 to 1937, the decades of the 1920s and 1930s still appear
as a flash in legal history. What was new in 1937 was the ascendancy of rational basis
scrutiny.
231 See, e.g., ROGER PILON, THE PURPOSE AND LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT 31-33 (Cato's
Letters No. 13, Cato Institute, 1999); Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the
Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34, 34-45; Bernard H.
Siegan, Separation of Powers and Economic Liberties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 415, 469-82
(1995) [hereinafter Siegan, Separation of Powers].
232 For more on Progressivism, see generally Thomas G. West, The Constitutionalism
of The Founders Versus Modern Liberalism, 6 NEXUS 75 (2001); ERIC FONER, THE STORY
OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 163-93 (1998).
233 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
234 Id. at 518.
235 Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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blind to the fact that the socialistic trend in American political
thought would finally demand extensive paternal legislation in
no uncertain terms; and that when this demand became strong
enough serious consequences might follow the failure of the
courts to acquiesce ....
... [T]he necessity for the establishment of a benevolent atti-
tude towards social reform was apparent... [yet] the Constitu-
tion was regarded as almost immutable. . . . [N]o further
[Amendment] might be looked for short of a popular upheaval.
Next to amendment of the Constitution, the most feasible
means of giving validity to new principles was to change the in-
terpretation of the provisions under which the inevitable social
legislation would be held invalid. "Liberty of contract" and the
broad powers of review assumed by the courts under the 5th and
14th Amendments were the elements which barred the way to
reform,-and it is against these interpretations that Justice
Holmes' most significant attacks have been directed.236
As an element of this process of Constitutional pseudo-
amendment, it was necessary to ignore a few messy details, such
as centuries of precedent supporting the right to earn a living, and
to instead portray the economic liberty cases as the interlopers.
This effort was fruitful. In 1936, an admirer of Justice Brandeis
argued that the nineteenth century Court had adopted "[niew def-
initions of 'liberty' and 'property,"' including the right to earn a
living, as a "means... of the Judiciary's becoming substantially 'a
perpetual censor upon all legislation of the states.' ' 237  Today's
critics continue to deny the existence of this right. Peter Irons de-
236 DORSEY RICHARDSON, CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES OF JUSTICE OLWVER WENDELL
HOLMES 41 (1924) (footnote omitted). Perhaps I should add that Richardson approved of
this view. Id. at 43. ("[lIt is the duty of the courts to note the change in the very nature of
society, and to do away with the theories of the past that are erroneously being applied to
the present.").
237 ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE 128-29 (1936) (quot-
ing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-91 (1897)). Mason's hagiographic book is a
remarkable window into the shift in legal philosophy that went on in 1936-1937, and the
contradictory "pragmatism" that was written into Constitutional law in that era. In almost
gushing terms, Mason described Brandeis as "an avowed partisan of the common man; his
special concern is for those economically and financially dependent; he prefers human wel-
fare to property rights." Id. at 226. Mason's book blows apart the prevailing notion that
the New Deal Court did nothing more than awaken from the Lochner era legislating from
the bench, and return to the dispassionate weighing of the objective constitutionality of
laws. Brandeis "is at heart a crusader," convinced that "eighteenth century individualistic
philosophy of rights and property is no longer a creed adequate for modern life .... " Id. at
229, 232-33. Yet, while Mason confesses-indeed, applauds-that Brandeis "sustains so-
cial legislation ... because he believes it desirable and expedient as well as constitutional
.... " Id. at 224. Nevertheless, he excoriates the Lochner Court for being "possessed by
preconceived theory," and basing its opinions not "upon any statable rule, but rather upon
what social-political philosophy is held by a majority of the justices." Id. at 146, 149-50.
The solution to this contradiction, according to Mason, was for the Court to allow legisla-
tures "to experiment in things social and economic ... only when such enactments conform
with certain standards of social justice." Id. at 223. But, of course, those standards depend
on nothing more objective than a particular Justice's sensitivity "to present-day economic
and social ills . . . ." Id. at 227.
[Vol. 6:207
2003] The Right to Earn a Living 247
rides the Lochner Court for "[h]aving inserted 'liberty of contract'
into the Constitution."23  Robert Bork denounces Lochner and
similar cases stating, "[tihis was lawlessness. The Court made up
an entire new set of freedoms .... John Semonche wrote that
in his Lochner dissent, "Holmes was arguing against the use of the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect newly discovered individual
rights from control by state legislatures,"240 and refers to the "new
liberty of contract."241 Paul Kens claims that the right to pursue a
lawful calling was solely the brainchild of Stephen Field's dissent
in the Slaughter-House Cases. He argues "[Field] invented a new
right. Nowhere does the Constitution expressly guarantee a right
to engage in a trade or profession."24 2 Erwin Chemerinsky writes
that during "[tihe fifty years prior to 1937 .... The Supreme
Court... struck down progressive legislation enacted by state and
federal legislatures to protect workers and consumers. These de-
cisions reflected the Justices imposing their political and economic
philosophies."243 Such statements simply ignore the multiple pro-
tections for property and economic liberties in the Constitution-
backed as they were by over a century and a half of common law
protections for economic liberties.
Common criticisms during the Progressive Era that the eco-
nomic liberty cases promoted unlimited or extreme freedom of con-
tract, concepts supposedly central to Lochner, were merely straw
men. The common law had always protected consumers, had al-
ways struck down contracts if contrary to public policy-contracts
restraining trade, for instance-and had always permitted regula-
tions for the protection of the public. 244 But neither the minority
in the Slaughter-House Cases nor the majority in Lochner-nor,
238 IRONS, supra note 156, at 249 (emphasis added).
239 BORK, supra note 164, at 44. Bork's hostility to judicial review is particularly
extreme.
240 SEMONCHE, supra note 162, at 151 (emphasis added).
241 Id. at 150 (emphasis added).
242 KENS, supra note 102, at 117. Nowhere in his book does Kens mention Edward
Coke, which is ironic, since elsewhere he notes that the Court's holding in Munn that the
state could regulate businesses which are 'affected with a public interest"-was based on
the 'age-old legal authority" of Lord Hale, another seventeenth century English Chief Jus-
tice. Id. at 161. See also Eastman & Sandefur, supra note 181, at 126.
243 Erwin Chemerinsky, Wrong Questions Get Wrong Answers: An Analysis of Professor
Carter's Approach to Judicial Review, 66 B.U. L. REV. 47, 61-62 (1986) (footnote omitted).
But see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 97 (1989) ("Without judicial enforcement, the Constitu-
tion is little more than the parchment that sits under glass in the National Archives.").
244 See, e.g., Chi. v. Rumpff, 45 Ill. 90, 99 (Ill. 1867).
[Cities], no doubt, have the power to designate the particular quarter of the city
within which the business may be conducted, and prohibit it in others, and regu-
late and restrain them so as to prevent their becoming offensive or injurious, but
in doing so all persons should be free to engage in the business within those locali-
ties by conforming to the municipal regulations.
Id. See also Chi. Packing & Provision Co. v. Chicago, 88 Ill. 221 (Ill. 1878) (explaining
police power right to control businesses).
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for that matter, any decision in any case, state or federal-had
ever held otherwise. What Lochner had said was that it was the
duty of the Court to look behind the facial justification of the law
at its substantive effect. Just as the Yick Wo Court had looked
behind the alleged health and safety justification for the law and
seen the anti-Chinese intent, so the Lochner Court found that the
regulation had no relation to "the health of the employee, as to
justify us in regarding the section as really a health law. It seems
to us that the real object and purpose were simply to regulate the
hours of labor .... The Lochner Court explicitly recognized the
right of the state to pass legitimate health and safety regulations,
which were equally binding upon all those involved in that trade.
However, this did not satisfy the Progressives, because at the
heart of Progressivism was an abandonment of the age-old distinc-
tion between public and private activity. The common law had
always permitted government to regulate activities that had pub-
lic effects-that is, nuisances, or other such effects upon third per-
sons who were protected because they had not chosen to take on
such burdens. Private activities, by contrast, could not be regu-
lated because society was not concerned in them. Over the course
of the Progressive Era, however, the concept of "public effects" was
broadened more and more in order to accommodate increasing
regulation of eventually almost every private activity.246 For ex-
ample, John Dewey, probably the most important Progressivist in-
tellectual, explicitly denounced "the notion that there are two
different 'spheres' of action and of rightful claims; that of political
society and that of the individual, and that in the interest of the
latter the former must be as contracted as possible."247 Of course,
since all actions have some attenuated public effects, Progressiv-
ism found an opportunity to abandon nearly all restraints on gov-
ernmental power, and to replace limited government with, in
Dewey's words, "that form of social organization, extending to all
the areas and ways of living, in which the powers of individuals
245 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
246 See ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 41-42 (Yale
Univ. Press, 1976) (1922) ("[With the coming of Progressivism,] [fireedom of engaging in
lawful callings came to be restricted, and an elaborate process of education and examina-
tion to be imposed upon those who would engage in them, lest there be injury to the public
health, safety, or morals."). Cf John Lawrence Hill, A Third Theory of Liberty: The Evolu-
tion of Our Conception of Freedom in American Constitutional Thought, 29 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 115, 171-72 (2002).
[Olne of the most striking developments in the trajectory of liberal thought from
its classical to its contemporary variants is the movement, from moralistic to pa-
ternalistic modes of justification, with respect to the increasing number of laws
that limit private and consensual activity.... [Tihe dark side of modern progres-
sivism has been its willingness to limit individual liberty in the name of individual
security or well-being.
Id.
247 JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 5 (Capricorn Books 1963) (1935).
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shall not be merely released from mechanical external constraint
but shall be fed, sustained and directed."2 4' The abandonment of
the distinction between public and private, and the resulting
abandonment of limitations on government power, are typified in
Carolene Products and its sister cases.249
Lochner had stood merely for the proposition that state action
which imposed a burden on the individual's right to make con-
tracts must be justified by evidence that the statute was a legiti-
mate attempt to protect the health and safety of citizens.
Carolene Products announced that such evidence would simply be
presumed to exist-a presumption so strong that, to overcome it, a
challenger must demonstrate the utter irrationality of the chal-
lenged regulation. 250 This sort of reasoning arguably reached its
height when the Court found, in Wickard v. Filburn, that Con-
gress' power to "regulat[e] . . . commerce . . . among the states"
meant it could regulate the private gardens of individuals who
grew wheat only for their own private consumption. Contrast
this with the Case of the City of London, where the Court refused
to find Jacob Wagoner liable for breaking the regulation of candle-
makers, because the evidence "doth not shew that he sold any can-
dles, &c. [sic] for if he made them for his own use, without selling
any for lucre or gain, he might well do it, as every one may bake or
brew, &c. [sic] for his own use, without selling bread or beer
"252
248 Id. at 31 (emphasis added). Roscoe Pound was similarly candid: "The political and
juristic preaching of today leads logically to absolutism." RoscoE POUND, CONTEMPORARY
JURISTIC THEORY 9 (1940).
249 As Roger Pilon writes,
The value-laden distinction between two kinds of rights ["fundamental" rights ver-
sus "economic" rights, from Carolene Products] is nowhere to be found in the Con-
stitution, of course. It was written from whole cloth to pave the way for the
redistributive and regulatory programs of the New Deal. Indeed, Rexford Tugwell,
one of the principal architects of the New Deal, said as much some 30 years after
Carolene Products was decided: "To the extent that these [New Deal policies] de-
veloped, they were tortured interpretations of a document [i.e., the Constitution]
intended to prevent them."
Pilon, supra note 231, at 31 (footnote omitted).
250 It is ironic that Justice Brandeis of all people endorsed this position. Brandeis is
associated with the so-called "Brandeis Brief," a mechanism by which a mound of sociologi-
cal and statistical data would be submitted to a court to illustrate the validity of a proposed
scheme. But once on the Court, Brandeis held that no such evidence was even necessary. I
am indebted to Professor Randy E. Barnett for this observation.
251 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
252 77 Eng. Rep. 658, 669 (K.B. 1610) (footnotes omitted). Another ironic note is to be
found in Bush v. Seabury, 8 Johns. 418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). There a statute permitted city
officials to regulate public markets, with the single exception that they could not regulate
the price of bread offered for sale. The court rejected the plaintiffs arguments against the
statute as reductio ad absurdam: "Extravagant cases may be stated of the abuse of the
power," the court said, "as by an ordinance to regulate the sale of wheat, &c. but this is not
a logical way to test the existence of the power." Id. at 420-21. By the time of Wickard,
what the New York court had thought too absurd for discussion had become national eco-
nomic policy and constitutional law.
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Another criticism of the economic liberty cases is the argu-
ment that they embodied "conservative" values, and tended to per-
petuate class distinctions. Justice Souter, for instance, has said
that Lochner and its progeny perpetuated the "ordering of eco-
nomic and social relationships."253 In fact, precisely the opposite is
true. The free market is a great disrupter of social stratification.
Only in government-controlled economies can a stable class struc-
ture safely take root; while in a free market, each individual may
pursue his own dreams and make his own place in the world-or,
more to the point, her own place. Consider for example one case
which arose nearly a century ago, when for the first time ever,
women were trying to become lawyers. In Bradwell v. Illinois,
Myra Bradwell attempted to practice the profession of law, but an
existing occupational regulation prevented her from doing so.254
When she sued, the Court upheld the regulation on the same
grounds that such regulations are justified today: that she did not
know what was best for her, but her state did.255 Bradwell, which
might be called "the Slaughter-House For Her," is a great illustra-
tion of how nothing ossifies the stable, class-structured society,
where everybody "knows his or her place," more efficiently than
the bureaucratic state. The great strides which have been made
by women in the legal profession since the outdated era of
Bradwell evidence the point. Those who believe a woman's place
is in the home have much to gain by making it harder for her to
get a business license, harder to get a job, harder for her to pursue
her dreams. Alternatively, those who believe that a grown woman
has the right to make her own contracts, and does not need an
older, wiser government to save her from herself, should embrace
the free market. It is unfortunate for the latter group that today,
the overwhelming majority of legal academics agree with Souter's
paternalistic, and yes, conservative view.256
VII. THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING IN TODAY'S WORLD
Prior to the advent of rational basis review, the Court had
defended the idea of the right to pursue a lawful occupation. In
Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court listed this right among others which
were protected by the word "liberty" in the Fourteenth
Amendment:
253 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 166 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
254 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 131-32 (1872).
255 Id. at 142.
256 I am hardly the first to point out this convergence of left and right in opposition to
the free market. There are some better analyses of this phenomenon. See generally
DINESH D'SouzA, THE VIRTUE OF PROSPERITY: FINDING VALUES IN AN AGE OF TECHNO-AF-
FLUENCE (2000); VIRGINIA POSTREL, THE FUTURE AND ITS ENEMIES: THE GROWING CONFLICT
OVER CREATIVITY, ENTERPRISE, AND PROGRESS (1998).
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[1]t denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. The estab-
lished doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with,
under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative
action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the state to effect. Determi-
nation by the Legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of
police power is not final or conclusive but is subject to supervi-
sion by the courts.257
Even after Carolene Products, and even while the Court up-
held legislation that infringed on free economic action, it did not
entirely abandon the idea of the right to pursue a lawful calling.
In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, the Court reviewed a
California law which repealed the state's prior practice of granting
fishing licenses to residents regardless of citizenship.2 5 8 In 1943,
the state began issuing these licenses only to citizens, which
meant that Japanese immigrants like Mr. Takahashi, who by fed-
eral law could not acquire U.S. citizenship, were no longer permit-
ted to work as fishermen.25 9 The state asserted that its
"proprietary interest in fish in the ocean waters within 3 miles of
the shore . . . justified the State in barring all aliens in general
and aliens ineligible to citizenship in particular from catching
fish."26 0 As in Lochner, the Court did not stop at this asserted in-
terest, however, and, as in Yick Wo and Truax, it found that the
law was actually an attempt to discriminate against Japanese im-
migrants, stating:
To all intents and purposes and in effect the provision in the
1943 and 1945 amendments are the same, the thin veil used to
conceal a purpose being too transparent. Under each and both,
alien Japanese are denied a right to a license to catch fish on the
high seas for profit . . . this discrimination constitutes an une-
qual exaction and a greater burden upon the persons of the class
named than that imposed upon others in the same calling and
under the same conditions, and amounts to prohibition. This
discrimination, patently hostile, is not based upon a reasonable
ground of classification and, to that extent, the section is in vio-
lation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States.26 1
257 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
258 334 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1948).
259 Id.
260 Id. at 414.
261 Id. at 426-27 (quoting trial court).
20031
Chapman Law Review
Still, Carolene Products had announced the regime under
which America still lives-that economic regulations would be
subjected only to "rational basis review." The right of the individ-
ual to earn an honest living has suffered greatly at the hands of
rational basis review,262 and an example of the hostility with
which the "economic substantive due process" cases are held can
be seen in Justice David Souter's concurring opinion in Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg.263 Souter likened the economic due process
cases to the infamous Dred Scott case, in which the Supreme
Court had upheld a constitutionality of slavery.264 The Lochner
Court had "harbored the spirit of Dred Scott in their absolutist
implementation of the standard they espoused."265 The irony of
likening the economic liberty cases to Dred Scott eluded Justice
Souter, as it would not have eluded, say, Frederick Douglass, who
captured the importance of the freedom of contract in his
memoirs, when he recalled his feelings on receiving his first wages
as a free man:
[T]he dear lady put into my hand two silver half-dollars. To un-
derstand the emotion which swelled my heart as I clasped this
money, realizing that I had no master who could take it from
me-that it was mine-that my hands were my own, and could
earn more of the precious coin-one must have been in some
sense himself a slave.266
Nevertheless, Souter wrote almost as powerfully in his dis-
sent in Seminole Tribe v. Florida:
It was the defining characteristic of the Lochner era, and its
characteristic vice, that the Court treated the common-law
background (in those days, common-law property rights and
contractual autonomy) as paramount, while regarding congres-
sional legislation to abrogate the common law on these economic
262 See, e.g., Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In this case, the
Supreme Court struck down a federal minimum wage law which set wage standards for
employees of State governments. Id. at 856. Nowhere in the opinion did the Court consider
the rights of those employees who would inevitably lose their jobs as a result of the forced
increase in costs of employment. The Court instead held that the law would "significantly
alter or displace the States' abilities to structure employer-employee relationships." Id. at
851. Yet the minimum wage statute in Adkins significantly altered the employee's and the
employer's ability to structure their own relationships. One would think that such private
actors should have even more freedom of contract than a State government, since the latter
is a state actor. But Usery was based purely on protecting the efficient working of govern-
ments, and was not truly concerned with the rights of employees to seek employment on
their own terms.
263 521 U.S. 702, 752-89 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
264 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
265 521 U.S. at 761. Cf State v. Goodwill, 10 S.E. 285, 287 (W. Va. 1889) ("The enjoy-
ment or deprivation of these rights and privileges, [i.e., the right to pursue a lawful occupa-
tion] constitutes the essential distinction between freedom and slavery; between liberty
and oppression.").
266 Frederick Douglass, The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass, reprinted in
DOUGLASS: AUTOBIOGRAPHIES 453, 654 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1994).
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matters as constitutionally suspect. And yet the superseding
lesson... that action within the legislative power is not subject
to greater scrutiny merely because it trenches upon the case
law's ordering of economic and social relationships, seems to
have been lost on the Court.267
Yet the economic substantive due process cases were not at all
what Souter claimed. Neither Lochner nor Adkins held that the
common law could not be reached by the legislature, or that it
trumped the Constitution. They simply said that laws which in-
fringed on common law rights-which rights had been incorpo-
rated by the Constitution's text and by the Fourteenth
Amendment-must in fact have the health and safety effect which
the legislature claimed, and not be mere pretexts for seizing eco-
nomic power for economic or political pressure groups.268 Souter's
characterization of Adkins as holding that it "treated the common-
law as paramount," is belied by Adkins' own text: "There is, of
course, no such thing as absolute freedom of contract" and "[i]t
must frequently yield to the common good."2 69
Still, in deriding the right to earn an honest living, Souter is
in the company of most legal scholars. In modern academia, the
common law right to earn an honest living has received only mini-
mal notice. In two masterful 1994 articles, Professor Wayne Mc-
Cormack referred to it as "the right of livelihood,"270 arguing that
"the range from economic to personal liberty choices is a spectrum,
not a dichotomy."271 Just because a person chooses to act in such a
way that brings him profit, McCormack argued, does not mean
that the act should lose its protection as the act of a person enti-
tled to freedom: "Property and liberty may be two words that ex-
press the opposite ends of a spectrum of human conduct from the
most autonomous (liberty) to the most interconnected (prop-
267 517 U.S. 44, 166 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Souter is
generally considered the most liberal member of today's Court, but he is joined in this
interpretation by the arch-conservative Robert Bork. See BORK, supra note 164, at 47
("Perhaps there ought to have been a constitutional provision invalidating those [economic
regulations]. But there was not, and the Court had no business striking them down.").
268 See In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 110 (N.Y. 1885).
269 Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546, 561 (1923).
270 McCormack, Economic, supra note 132. See also Peter Huang, Preventing Post-
PepsiCo Disaster: A Proposal for Refining the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 15 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 379, 405 ("The government should not be able to take
away the right to control one's livelihood without adequate safeguards."); Wayne McCor-
mack, Property and Liberty - Institutional Competence and the Functions of Rights, 51
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1994) [hereinafter McCormack, Property]; Alan J. Meese, Will,
Judgment, and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter and the Mistranslation of the Due
Process Clause, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 3, 21 (1999) ("[Alny abridgment of the right to
pursue a calling or to make a contract that does not fall within the police power so defined
is arbitrary and inconsistent with the meaning attributed to the Due Process Clause by
those authorities on which Justice Souter relied.").
271 See McCormack, Property, supra note 270, at 59.
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erty)."272 This is simply a restatement of Madison's belief that just
government does not "deny to part of its citizens that free use of
their faculties, and free choice of their occupations, which.., are
the means of acquiring property strictly so called."27 3
Perversely, the term "right to livelihood" has more frequently
become attached to an argument in favor of a Constitutional right
to welfare payments-that is, a right to be maintained above a
specified poverty level, at the expense of others who work. 274 This
is most certainly not what Coke and subsequent common law
courts had in mind. Rather, they sought specifically to enforce an
individual's "negative right" to be free from interference while go-
ing about the business of earning an honest living, under the most
minimal restrictions necessary and proper for protecting consum-
ers or preventing public dangers and nuisances.275 This is, as
Chancellor Kent said, a guaranty of freedom of action-in short, it
is the freedom of contract. It is what Locke called "a Liberty to
dispose, and order, as he lists, his Person, Actions, Possessions,
and his whole Property, within the Allowance of those Laws under
which he is; and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary Will of
another, but freely follow his own."276 While all along the common
law had stipulated that government may impose regulations on
the practice of that right-as Locke says, "[man has] an Under-
standing to direct his Actions... and liberty of Acting... within
the bounds of that Law he is under"277-those regulations could be
unreasonable infringements on freedom when they deprived a
person of his freedom to pursue a lawful occupation. This requires
some exercise of judgment with regard to the reasonableness of
those restrictions. This substantive due process protection is in
the tradition of what is now nearly eight hundred years of com-
mon law, and in the defense of a right which was certainly "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."27
The emptiness of the prevailing view of economic liberties is
nowhere more clearly revealed, than by the fact that the right to
earn a living has proven too important for the Court or the acad-
emy to ignore completely. One rarely finds a detractor of Lochner
who is consistent enough to call for the reversal of Yick Wo or the
272 Id.
273 See Madison, supra note 91, at 516.
274 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of
Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1986); Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State
Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1131, 1133 n.9(1999) (including a long list of articles in which "[s]cholars have put forward a range of
normative arguments in favor of welfare rights").
275 The bold assertion that there is no distinction between positive rights and negative
rights is nothing new. See Tom G. Palmer, Book Review, 19 CATO J. 331 (1999).
276 LocKE, supra note 94, at 324.
277 Id.
278 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
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revival of Bradwell.279 In a variety of cases, the Supreme Court
and state courts have invoked this right, and even struck down
licensing schemes which infringe upon it. One of the legal areas
in which this issue has arisen was in the anti-communist hysteria
of the first half of the twentieth century. Barsky v. Bd. of Regents
of the State of New York,28 0 involved a doctor whose license was
revoked when he refused to submit to an investigation into his
alleged communist sympathies. The Court upheld this action, but
the arch-liberal Justice William Douglas dissented, writing that:
The right to work, I had assumed, was the most precious liberty
that man possesses. Man has indeed as much right to work as
he has to live, to be free, to own property .... It does many men
little good to stay alive and free and propertied, if they cannot
work. To work means to eat. It also means to live....
... [So] the question here is not what government must give, but
rather what it may not take away.281
This is exactly the holding of Lochner, Adkins, and other now
reviled cases: laws which infringe on a person's right to pursue a
lawful calling should be subjected to substantive judicial scrutiny.
Douglas' view was echoed decades later in Board of Regents v.
Roth.282 There, the Court reviewed the complaint of a professor
from a state college who was fired for criticizing the administra-
tion of the school. The Court held that the professor did have the
right "to engage in any of the common occupations of life," and
that "[there might be cases in which a State refused to re-employ
a person under such circumstances that interests in liberty would
be implicated."283
Today, licensing statutes are all too frequently used as a
method of monopolizing trade for a few privileged individuals or
corporations. 28 4 The regulation of taxicabs is an example common
in American states. In Colorado, a man named Leroy Jones, who
made a living by selling hotdogs at Denver's Mile-High Stadium,
279 One who was so consistent was Justice Hugo Black, who dissented in Griswold v.
Connecticut, on the grounds that the case, like the pre-New Deal cases, embodied what he
called the "shocking doctrine" that some activities were beyond the reach of government.
381 U.S. 479, 519 (1965). "I had thought," Black said, "that we had laid that formula, as a
means for striking down state legislation, to rest once and for all." Id. at 522.
28o 347 U.S. 442, 445 (1954).
281 Id. at 472-73.
282 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
283 Id. at 572-73.
284 David Bernstein has done much outstanding work demonstrating that the primary
victims of occupational licensing are poor minorities. See generally David E. Bernstein,
Lochner, Parity, And The Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1999);
David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical Example of the Use of Government Regu-
latory Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 89 (1994); David E. Bern-
stein, Roots of The "Underclass": The Decline of Laissez-Faire Jurisprudence And The Rise
of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U.L. REV. 85 (1993).
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decided to start his own taxi company.285 But in order to operate a
taxicab in Colorado, one must be granted a certificate of public
convenience and necessity-that is, approval by a state board that
a new taxi company is needed in the city.2"6 Of course the board is
run by a handful of taxi operators with no interest in increasing
their competition. But even if it were to operate under the purest
of motivations, how does one go about proving that a city needs a
new business, of whatever sort? 87 Nobody could have known, in
the 1960s, that Americans needed electronic mail, cellular tele-
phones, or compact disc players, and these things would never
have come about, had their introduction into commerce been pred-
icated on approval by a state board made up of the manufacturers
of stationery, rotary dial phones, or record players. Jones sued,
basing his claim on, inter alia, his right to pursue a lawful occupa-
tion, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."' Of course, he
lost. The court held that "'the argument that the clause creates a
substantive right to pursue one's lawful occupation or profession
free from state limitations was laid to rest long ago by the United
States Supreme Court.' ' 289  Fortunately, the state legislature
changed the law, to allow more competition.29 °
One recent case illustrates even more clearly the problem of
licensing statutes. In Craigmiles v. Giles, a Tennessee law, which
made it illegal for a person to sell a coffin without being a licensed
funeral director, was at issue.2 91 This license required a person to
pay a large fee and attend classes in subjects like embalming-
subjects of little importance to a person who merely wanted to sell
a box.292 A number of casket retailers sued, arguing that this
scheme violated their right to earn a living, for the aggrandize-
ment of those who already possessed funeral director licenses. 293
The state defended the regulation as a necessary public health
and safety measure, but the district court rejected this argument,
calling it "somewhat of a joke," and found in favor of the casket
sellers: "The requirement certainly has nothing to do with public
285 See CLINT BOLICK, TRANSFORMATION: THE PROMISE AND POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT
76-80 (1998).
286 Jones v. Temmer, 829 F. Supp. 1226, 1229 (D. Colo. 1993), vacated by 57 F.3d 921
(10th Cir. 1995). Note the similarity to the regulatory scheme at issue in New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
287 This point is more thoroughly developed in AlKEs, supra note 223, at 51-61.
2s8 829 F. Supp. at 1233. Cf Checker Cab Co. v. Johnson City, 216 S.W.2d 335, 337
(1948) (striking down taxi licensing scheme because "'the power in a municipal corporation
to license or regulate a useful trade does not carry the implied authority to ... create a
monopoly therein'") (quoting 36 AM. J. Jumls. 524).
289 Jones, 829 F. Supp. at 1233-34 (quoting Galahad v. Weinshienk, 555 F. Supp. 1201,
1207 (D. Colo. 1983)).
290 See Jones v. Temmer, 57 F.3d 921, 922 (10th Cir. 1995).
291 110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 659 (E.D. Tenn. 2000), affd, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
292 Id. at 660.
293 Id. at 659, 661.
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health and safety. A casket is nothing more than a container for
human remains. '"294 The court even explained that while "lilt is
not for this trial court to breathe new life into the Privileges and
Immunities Clause 127 years after its demise.... the argument of
the Slaughter-House dissenters may reflect historical truth[, and]
it may be time, as Justice Thomas suggests ... to take another
look at the Privileges and Immunities Clause and its place within
the Fourteenth Amendment."295 In December, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.2 96 "[P]rotecting a discrete interest
group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental
purpose," the court noted.297 Although the court declined to ad-
dress the Slaughter-House Cases, it noted that the licensing
scheme was "nothing more than an attempt to prevent economic
competition. 298
The danger of licensing schemes becoming a method for mono-
polizing trade was also touched on in a series of recent anti-trust
cases.299 In 1963, an American Medical Association committee,
which was formed to investigate the claims of chiropractic
medicine, determined their claims were scientifically unsound,
and that under medical ethics principles, no doctor could be per-
mitted to refer patients to chiropractors, or even to associate with
chiropractors. s° While they may have had sound scientific rea-
sons for reaching this conclusion, this clearly interfered with not
only the rights of chiropractors to pursue their businesses, but
with the right of doctors to refer their patients to specialists if, in
their medical judgment, such a referral was proper. But more im-
portantly, the AMA's special position-essentially in control of the
career of every doctor in the country-led it to become a monopoly.
Wrote one Circuit Court,
Getting needed information to the market is a fine goal, but the
district court found that the AMA was not motivated solely by
294 Craigmiles, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 662, 664 n.3. Cf. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220,
225 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Tennessee's justifications for the 1972 amendment come close to strik-
ing us with 'the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish .... ") (quoting United
States v. Searan, 259 F.3d 434, 447 (6th Cir. 2001)).
295 Id. at 665-67.
296 Craigmiles, 312 F.3d 220 (2002).
297 Id. at 224.
298 Id. at 225. But see Powers v. Harris, No. CIV-01-445-F, 2002 WL 32026155 (W.D.
Okla. Dec. 12, 2002) (mem.) (upholding identical statute in Oklahoma).
299 Wilk v. AMA, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990); Chiropractic Coop. Ass'n of Michigan v.
AMA, 867 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1989); Myers v. ADA, 695 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1982). Due to
"rational relationship scrutiny," recent cases addressing the right to earn a living have in
general been antitrust cases as opposed to cases against wrongful government action. See,
e.g., Twine v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 311 So. 2d 299 (Ala. 1975). Private contracts in
restraint of professions have been disfavored by the common law for centuries, just as state
action, which does the same thing. Cf Tomlinson v. Humana, Inc., 495 So. 2d 630 (Ala.
1986). While the AMA cases did not involve issues of state action, the unique position of
the AMA in licensing doctors should raise such questions.
300 Wilk, 895 F.2d at 356.
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such altruistic concerns. Indeed, the court found that the AMA
intended to "destroy a competitor," namely, chiropractors. It is
not enough to carry the day to argue that competition should be
eliminated in the name of public safety.3 °1
Today, the Supreme Court and other courts continue to refer, in
dicta, to the individual's right to pursue a lawful occupation. 2  In
some dicta, it has even been referred to as a "fundamental"
right.3  In different contexts it has abided by the rule that stat-
utes in derogation of common law rights should be strictly con-
strued,304 and it has noted that "[lliberty under law extends to the
full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it
cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective."30 5
In Toomer v. Witsell, °6 the Court held "that commercial shrimping
in the marginal sea, like other common callings, is within the pur-
view of the privileges and immunities clause."30 ' As recently as
1999 the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the right to "choose one's field of private employment...
subject to reasonable government regulation."35  But the Court
upheld the regulation in that case. Likewise, in United Building &
Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, °9 the Court
wrote that "the pursuit of a common calling" is "[c]ertainly" one of
the "most fundamental of those privileges protected" by the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article Four. But the Court up-
held the regulation there as well. 1°
In Lowe v. SEC,311 the Court struck down an injunction which
had been secured by the Securities and Exchange Commission
against a group of former investment advisors. These advisors
had lost their SEC licenses, and thus could no longer offer profes-
sional investment advice. Instead they began to publish a news-
letter expressing their opinions on stock market investments. The
301 Id. at 361 (citing Nat'l Soc'y of ProflI Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)).
302 See, e.g., Lebbos v. Judges of Superior Court, 883 F.2d 810, 818 (9th Cir. 1989);
Benigni v. City of Hemet, 868 F.2d 307, 312 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining that substantive
due process "protects a liberty or property interest in pursuing the 'common occupations or
possessions of life.'") (quoting Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957)).
See also Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 762 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1985).
303 See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 n.10 (1985).
304 See, e.g., Norfolk Redev. & Housing Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of
Virginia, 464 U.S. 30, 35 (1983).
305 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
306 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
307 Id. at 403 (emphasis added). The Court is referring to the Article Four Privileges
and Immunities Clause, not to the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. See also Hicklin v. Orbeck,
437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978) (privileges and immunities clause of Article Four prohibits "state
discrimination against nonresidents seeking to ply their trade, practice their occupation, or
pursue a common calling within the State").
308 Connecticut v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 292 (1999).
309 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
310 Id. at 219, 221.
311 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
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SEC enjoined them on the grounds that the loss of their licenses
prohibited them from offering the public investment advice.112
The investors responded that their right to publish was protected
by the First Amendment, and the Court agreed.
This issue involves a collision between the power of government
to license and regulate those who would pursue a profession or
vocation and the rights of freedom of speech and of the press
guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Court determined
long ago that although "[iut is undoubtedly the right of every cit-
izen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business,
or profession he may choose, . . . there is no arbitrary depriva-
tion of such right where its exercise is not permitted because of
a failure to comply with conditions imposed . . . for the protec-
tion of society." Regulations on entry into a profession, as a gen-
eral matter, are constitutional if they "have a rational
connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice"
the profession.313
State courts have also protected this right. Texas courts have
held that citizens "hav[e] a vested property right in making a liv-
ing."1 4 In 1938, a New York court held that a statute requiring
podiatrists to obtain licenses could not be applied to shoe sales-
men.315 This rule was followed in a Connecticut case, Connecticut
Chiropody Society, Inc. v. Murray, in which the court held that "[a]
statute which restricts the conduct of an occupation which was
lawful at common law should be construed with reasonable strict-
ness."316 Wyoming has also held that "[statutes which impose re-
strictions on trade or common occupations, or which levy an excise
tax upon them, are generally construed strictly."317
In Estes v. Gadsden, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a broad licensing tax "for the privilege of en-
gaging in or following any trade, occupation or profession within
the corporate limits of the city and covers all salaried or wage-
earning employees." 318 At the same time, though, the court noted
that "[tihe right to earn a livelihood is an inalienable right guar-
anteed by the Bill of Rights."31 9 Likewise, the California Supreme
Court has declared the right to earn a living a "fundamental"
312 Id. at 184-85.
313 Id. at 228 (citations omitted). See also Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. CFTC, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15877 (E.D. Ill. 1999).
314 Smith v. Decker, 213 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Tex. 1958).
315 People v. Dr. Scholl's Foot Comfort Shops, Inc., 13 N.E.2d 750 (N.Y. 1938).
316 153 A.2d 412, 414 (Conn. 1959). See also Hart v. Bd. of Exam'rs of Embalmers, 26
A.2d 780, 782 (Conn. 1942) (embalmer's licensing scheme "restricts a common right and
thus derogates from the common law and should be strictly construed in favor of the right")
(internal citation omitted).
317 State v. Capital Coal Co., 88 P.2d 481, 483 (Wyo. 1939). See also County of Natrona
v. Casper Air Serv., 536 P.2d 142 (Wyo. 1975).
318 94 So. 2d 744, 746 (Ala. 1957).
319 Id. at 750.
2003] 259
260 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 6:207
one.2 ° Like Texas, Arizona considers the right of occupation a
property right.3 21 And at least one Georgia case has held that a
person's "right to earn a living is not to be denied him without his
day in court."322 But other courts, for instance in Hawaii, have
declared that the right to earn a living is not a fundamental
right.3 23
New York courts have recognized this right,324 and have even
stated that "[m]onopolistic restrictions on the right to earn a liv-
ing are odious devices."325 Yet recently, the Supreme Court of New
York stated that "[tihe right to do business has never been consid-
ered a fundamental right."3 26 This confusion persists elsewhere.
In Florida, for instance, where the Supreme Court has declared
that "[tihe fundamental right to earn a livelihood in pursuing
some lawful occupation is protected by the Constitution, and in
fact, many authorities hold that the preservation of such right is
one of the inherent or inalienable rights protected by the Constitu-
tion."327 Citing the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit has like-
wise said that one of the Fourteenth Amendment's protections is
the right of the individual "'to engage in any of the common occu-
pations of life.' ' 325 Yet the Eleventh Circuit has also stated that
"[t]he [Supreme] Court, however, has never held that the right to
320 See Conway v. State Bar of California, 767 P.2d 657, 675 n.7 (Cal. 1989) (Kaufman,
J., dissenting). See also Sei Fujii v. State of California, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952) (restric-
tions on immigrants owning land interferes with right to earn a living).
321 Buehman v. Bechtel, 114 P.2d 227, 231 (Ariz. 1941).
322 Leakey v. Ga. Real Estate Comm'n, 55 S.E.2d 818, 819 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949).
323 Nagle v. Bd. of Ed., 629 P.2d 109, 116 (Haw. 1981) (citing Mass. Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)).
324 See, e.g., Ribotsky v. Lupkin, 452 N.Y.S.2d 806 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); Howell v. Ben-
son, 432 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
325 Di Carlo v. State Liquor Auth., 282 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
326 Ricketts v. City of New York, 688 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (quoting
Tel. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 564 F. Supp. 880, 891 (N.D. Ill.
1982)). It is particularly interesting to compare this case with Robinson v. Watkins, 90
Eng. Rep. 165 (K.B. 1702), which involved practically the same facts--only, almost three
centuries earlier. See supra text accompanying note 78. Ricketts, like Temmer, reveals a
continuing problem that some authors have called "transit racism." See Robert D. Bullard
et al., The Costs and Consequences of Suburban Sprawl: The Case of Metro Atlanta, 17 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 935, 967-70 (2001). Regulation of the taxicab industry has a profoundly
negative impact on racial minorities, while benefiting established, politically powerful car-
tels. The power of taxi licensing extends even further. In 1955, Martin Luther King's
Montgomery bus boycott was almost destroyed when city officials used the licensing laws to
enjoin the carpool network which the boycotters established in order to get from one place
to another without using the buses. The city argued that the boycotters were operating a
taxi company without a license, and actually did get the injunction. As a result, for the last
month of the boycott, the protesters were forced to walk. See also TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING
THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 145, 193-94 (1989); WALTER E. WILLIAMS, THE
STATE AGAINST BLACKS 75-86 (1982).
327 State ex rel. Hosack v. Yocum, 186 So. 448, 451 (Fla. 1939); accord Campos v. INS,
32 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
328 Silverstein v. Gwinnett Hosp. Auth., 861 F.2d 1560, 1566 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923))).
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pursue a particular occupation is a fundamental right, and it has
not applied strict scrutiny review to classifications affecting an in-
dividual's pursuit of his or her occupation. "329
This, in fact, is the reason for such confusion. While it is
sometimes politically expedient for courts to refer to the right of
occupation as a fundamental right-and while previous genera-
tions very much thought it fundamental-applying the strict scru-
tiny which is used whenever government interferes with other
fundamental rights would mean rolling back most of the vast gov-
ernmental edifice which has been built upon Carolene Products.33 °
We see then two great ironies. The first is that courts' reluctance
to apply strict scrutiny in this matter has required that when
courts do wish to protect the right to earn a living, they must do so
under clauses of the Constitution, such as the Equal Protection
Clause, or legal theories, such as Due Process, which were not pri-
marily meant for that job. Yet this is precisely what the left com-
plains of with regard to the economic substantive due process
cases-that they added to the definition of "due process" rights
which were not intended to be protected under that clause.
While courts often refer in dicta to the right to earn a living,
they rarely step in to protect that right from the interference of
groups legally protected from competition. This is due simply to a
single reason: rational relationship scrutiny. As one commentator
has written, "Slaughter- House would be a difficult case today, ex-
cept that the hard questions would be hidden by the assumption,
built into 'rational basis scrutiny,' that the states generally do not
act for forbidden purposes." 3 1 But that assumption is a notorious
and blatant fiction.3 32
329 Jones v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the Ala. State Bar, 737 F.2d 996, 1000 (11th Cir. 1984).
It is of course true that the Supreme Court has not applied strict scrutiny to infringements
of this right since 1937.
330 As one commentator has put it:
[E]mbracing economic substantive due process would require that liberals reject
some deeply ingrained beliefs and practices. For example, they would have to
abandon Progressive myths about the old Court, quit casting a blind eye on gov-
ernment's economic irrationality, partiality, and predatoriness, and stop winking
at pluralist log-rolling. Worst of all, liberals would have to admit that the suppos-
edly malign and ignorant reactionaries on the old Court knew things about busi-
ness and government that they and their Progressive forbears were unwilling or
unable to see.
Michael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of Economic Substantive Due Process, 49 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 917, 968-69 (1999) (internal citations omitted).
331 Harrison, supra note 136, at 1468 (emphasis added).
332 H.L. Mencken once wrote of Oliver Wendell Holmes:
The weak spot in his reasoning, if I may presume to suggest such a thing, was his
tacit assumption that the voice of the legislature was the voice of the people.
There is, in fact, no reason for confusing the people and the legislature: the two, in
these later years, are quite distinct. ... The typical lawmaker of today is a man
wholly devoid of principle-a mere counter in a grotesque and knavish game. If
the right pressure could be applied to him he would be cheerfully in favor of polyg-
amy, astrology or cannibalism.
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This is the second great irony: although Holmes, Brandeis,
and their descendants are often portrayed as enemies of formal-
ism,333 the rational basis test which they fashioned enshrines for-
malism d outrance. The Carolene Products presumption of
constitutionality is a prime exercise in formalism. So long as the
government's action bears some connection to a minimally ra-
tional economic policy, the Court refuses to look further, to the
real motive or real effect of the policy. This is the very definition
of formalism.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Constitution was formed in large part to protect the indi-
vidual's right to pursue a business without wrongful interference,
a right that was "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion."334 Although this right is an old one, it embodies important
liberal values of self-assertiveness and social mobility. The com-
ing of the New Deal, and the enshrinement of its quack economic
theories, required the abandonment of this long and important
tradition, and a new deference to political regulation that ignored
the fact that such regulatory powers are often exercised at the be-
hest of special interest groups who prosper at the expense of those
with less political power. It was to prevent this sort of political
jockeying that the Constitution was written. Unfortunately, for
many people today, the right to pursue happiness, by earning a
living, is void where prohibited by law. That right, and those peo-
ple, deserve to be protected by our courts today, just as they were
protected by our courts for many centuries before the New Deal.
H.L. MENCKEN, A MENCKEN CHRESTOMATHY 260-61 (H.L. Mencken ed., 1962). If Holmes'
views were generally accepted, Mencken wrote, "there would be scarcely any brake at all
upon lawmaking, and the Bill of Rights would have no more significance than the Code of
Manu." Id. at 260.
333 See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitu-
tional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (1990).
334 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
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APPENDIX At
The following is a list of state cases between 1823-when
Corfield v. Coryell was decided-and 1873-the year the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases were decided-in which the courts discussed or
protected the common law right to earn a living.
Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391, 397 (1824), available at 1824
WL 83, at *5 ("Every person has a common law right, to fish in a
navigable river or arm of the sea, until, by some legal mode of
appropriation, this common right is extinguished."); Smith v.
Spooner, 20 Mass. 229, 230 (1825), available at 1825 WL 2067, at
*2 ("Every man of full age and sound mind is at liberty to make
contracts ... unless by statute provision he is disabled. And disa-
bling statutes of that nature should be construed strictly, for
though founded in policy and a just regard to the public welfare,
they are in derogation of private rights."); Dunham & Daniels v.
Trustees of Rochester, 5 Cow. 462, 466 (N.Y. 1826) ("[Ilt does not
follow that any man is to depend, for the fair and innocent exer-
cise of his business, on the will of the [city, or]; that they have the
power of licensing his trade, at their pleasure; prohibiting it alto-
gether; or crippling it by heavy charges and grievous penalties.");
In re Nightingale, 28 Mass. 168, 174 (1831) (The challenged regu-
lation "does [not] operate as an improper restraint of trade, but is
a wholesome regulation of it."); Austin v. Murray, 33 Mass. 121,
126 (1834) ("[T]he law will not allow the right of property to be
invaded, under the guise of a police regulation for the preservation
of health, when it is manifest that such is not the object and pur-
pose of the regulation."); City of Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige Ch.
261 (N.Y. Ch. 1838) ("If the manufacture of pressed hay within the
compact parts of the city is dangerous in causing or promoting
fires, the common council have the power expressly given by their
charter to prevent the carrying on of such manufacture; but as all
by-laws must be reasonable, the common council cannot make a
by-law which shall permit one person to carry on the dangerous
business, and prohibit another, who has an equal right, from pur-
suing the same business."); Town of Columbia v. Beasly, 20 Tenn.
232, 240-41 (1839), available at 1839 WL 1286, at *4-5 ("The 5th
plea alleges that the tax was imposed with a view to prohibit the
defendant from pursuing a lawful occupation, and not for the pur-
pose of raising a revenue .... A by-law for oppression is void.");
Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137, 139 (1841), available at 1841 WL 123,
at *2 ("[TIhe enjoyment of all the rights of property, and the ut-
most freedom of action which may consist with the public welfare,
t All citations and direct quotes in the appendices have been have been verified using
the electronic versions of these materials available on Westlaw. Chapman Law Review is
not responsible for errors that may be contained in the electronic versions.
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is guarantied to every man, and no restraint can be lawfully im-
posed by the Legislature in relation thereto, which the paramount
claims of the community do not demand, or which does not operate
alike on all."); Rockwell v. Hubbell's Adm'rs, 2 Doug. 197, 200
(1846), available at 1846 WL 2864, at *2 ("'Regulations of this
description have always been considered, in every civilized com-
munity, as properly belonging to the remedy, to be exercised or
not, by every sovereignty, according to its own views of policy and
humanity. It must reside in every state, to enable it to secure its
citizens from unjust and harassing litigation, and to protect them
in those pursuits which are necessary to the existence and well-
being of every community.'"); Whitney v. Bartholomew, 21 Conn.
213, 217 (1851), available at 1851 WL 574, at *1 ("The trade and
occupation of carriage-making, or of a blacksmith, is a lawful and
useful one; and a building erected for its exercise, is not a nui-
sance per se."); Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268, 273 (1853)
("[I]nterference with the natural right of acquisition and enjoy-
ment guarantied by the constitution, can only be justified when
public necessity clearly demands it."); People v. Toynbee, 11 How.
Pr. 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (striking down anti-liquor law as in-
fringement of right to sell goods); State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290,
292 (1856), available at 1856 WL 981, at *2 ("[W]e see no ground
on which a prohibition of the owning or keeping of an article for
the purpose of a sale, which the legislature had no rightful power
to prevent, could be upheld."); In re New Orleans Draining Co., 11
La. Ann. 338, 352 (1856), available at 1856 WL 4729, at *15 (at-
torney arguing that "government cannot say to [a citizen] that he
shall follow this or that occupation, because the government
thinks that it will be either for his own, or the public good."); Da-
vis v. City of New York, 14 N.Y. 506, 524 (1856) (holding that city
government "had no power to grant to any person a [monopoly]
franchise for transporting passengers on the public streets, for
profit, for a single day, and the attempt to do so was absolutely
void."); Prevost v. Greneaux, 60 U.S. 1, 4 (1856) (attorney arguing
that "[slo far as statutes for the regulation of trade impose fines or
create forfeitures, they are doubtless to be construed strictly as
penal, and not liberally as remedial laws."); Norwich Gaslight Co.
v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19, 35 (1856), available at 1856
WL 912, at *10 ("[TIhe policy of the law is to encourage trade, by
the free competition of all who may choose to engage in it, and it
cannot recognize a right in the plaintiffs to interfere for the pur-
pose of preventing a public nuisance, on the ground of an interest
they have, as competitors with the defendants, for the public pa-
tronage in this business."); Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 517
(1858) ("The right to protect and possess property is not more
clearly protected by the Constitution than the right to acquire.");
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Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 6 Wis. 539, 547 (1858),
available at 1857 WL 2157, at *5 ("Odious as were monopolies to
the common law, they are still more repugnant to the genius and
spirit of our republican institutions, and are only to be tolerated
on the occasion of great public convenience or necessity."); City of
Davenport v. Kelley, 7 Iowa 102, 107 (1858), available at 1858 WL
230, at *4 (upholding regulation because "[it regulates, but does
not restrain [trade], and as a regulation there is no conceivable
objection to it."); Phelps v. Rooney, 9 Wis. 70 (1859), available at
1859 WL 2821, at *2 (court agreeing with counsel that "[a]ll stat-
utes which impose restrictions on trade or common occupations,
must be construed strictly."); Russell v. Sloan, 33 Vt. 656 (1861),
available at 1861 WL 3363 (refusing to apply anti-liquor law to
sale of "quack medicines" because law must be strictly construed);
Drexel & Co. v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. 31 (1863), available at
1863 WL 4920, at *4 ("Statutes which impose restrictions upon
trade or common occupations, or which levy an excise or tax upon
them, must be construed strictly."); Wreford v. People, 14 Mich.
41, 46 (1865), available at 1865 WL 2123, at *4 (Police "power can
only be exercised to do away with what are legally nuisances, and
does not authorize the council, as it could not, to interfere with
what is not a nuisance in fact."); New Orleans, Jackson & Great N.
R.R. Co. v. Bailey, 40 Miss. 395 (1866), available at 1866 WL 1889
(describing tort duties of those engaged in their "lawful calling");
City of Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 Ill. 90, 96 (1867), available at 1867
WL 5226, at *3 ("Hence their by-laws must be reasonable, and
such as are vexatious, unequal or oppressive, or are manifestly
injurious to the interest, of the corporation, are void. And of the
same character are all by-laws in restraint of trade, or which nec-
essarily tend to create a monopoly."); City of Bloomington v. Wahl,
46 Ill. 489, 492 (1868), available at 1868 WL 4914, at *2 ("The
ordinance must be reasonable, uniform in application throughout
the limits in which it has operation; it must not be in restraint of
trade; it must not create oppressive monopolies, but must be cal-
culated to advance the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
municipality."); Ducat v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill. 172, 178 (1868),
available at 1868 WL 5076, at *3 (Privileges and immunities
clause means "that the citizens of all the States should have the
peculiar advantage of acquiring and holding real as well as per-
sonal property, and that such property should.., not be liable to
any taxes or burdens which the property of the citizen is not sub-
ject to."); Hayes v. City of Appleton, 24 Wis. 542, 545 (1869), avail-
able at 1869 WL 2114, at *1 ("The selling of property at public
auction being a lawful business . . . it follows that [the challenged
regulation] is an unreasonable and unlawful interference with the
freedom of trade, and that the ordinance is for that reason void.");
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Pieri v. Town of Shieldsboro, 42 Miss. 493, 495 (1869), available at
1869 WL 3769, at *2 (city's order that lumberyard remove its lum-
ber invalid because "It cannot be seriously contended that the cor-
porate authorities of a town can, by an arbitrary ordinance,
destroy private property by force, or compel the owner of it to have
it removed, unless it was a nuisance, and so declared in the ordi-
nance."); United States v. Singer, 27 F. Cas. 1082, 1084 (N.D. Ill.
1870) (No. 16, 292) (striking down a liquor taxation scheme for
being "a series of restrictions and impositions, and a system of in-
quisition and espionage upon distilling-admitted by the act to be
a lawful occupation-which if extended to all other kinds of busi-
ness, would make the collection of taxes odious and oppressive
and indeed well nigh intolerable."); Parrott v. Barney, 18 F. Cas.
1236, 1243 (C.C.D. Cal. 1871) (No. 10, 773) ("[W]hy should a per-
son innocently ignorant of the qualities of a dangerous thing un-
consciously brought upon his premises in the pursuit of a lawful
calling, not only be compelled to sustain the damage suffered him-
self, but, also, that suffered by his neighbor from an accident re-
sulting therefrom without his fault.... In my judgment, the law
is not so rigorous and unreasonable."); Gale v. Village of
Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344, 355 (1871), available at 1871 WL 5613,
at *6 ("[Monopolies] are founded in destruction of trade, and can-
not be tolerated for a moment."); Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307, 315
(1871), available at 1871 WL 2973, at *4 (striking down ordinance
requiring license to sell "lemonade, ice cream, cakes, fruit, etc.,
[because it] is a perfectly lawful trade, and its restraint or regula-
tion is not demanded by the public welfare."); Moore v. Letchford,
35 Tex. 185, 216 (1871), available at 1872 WL 7381, at *17 (power
to exempt certain items from seizure in bankruptcy "must reside
in every state, to enable it to secure its citizens ... in those pur-
suits which are necessary to the existence and well being of every
community.").
In Smith v. Foster, 41 N.H. 215 (1860), the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held a contract illegal for being made on the Sab-
bath, and drew a distinction between one's ordinary calling and
one's secular calling, and held that "blue laws" were constitutional
as restrictions on the latter, not the former. This was more fully
explained in George v. George, 47 N.H. 27 (1866), available at 1866
WL 1962, at *1 (holding that making a will did not qualify as secu-
lar labor). Following this rule of strict construction, in Ah Hee v.
Crippen, 19 Cal. 491 (1861), Justice Field, later a dissenter in the
Slaughter-House Cases, held that a law requiring licenses for op-
erating mines could not require the licensing of mines operated on
privately held land.
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APPENDIX B
For many years before Lochner v. New York, it was an estab-
lished principle that: "The law will not allow rights of property to
be invaded under the guise of a police regulation for the preserva-
tion of health.., and when it appears that [public health] is not
the real object and purpose of the regulation, courts will interfere
to protect the rights of the citizen." Inhabitants of Watertown v.
Mayo, 109 Mass. 315, 319 (1872).
See also Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245, 270-71 (1819);
Town of Goshen v. Town of Stonington, 4 Conn. 209 (1822); Van-
derbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); Coates v. City
of New York, 7 Cow. 585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); Wally's Heirs v.
Kennedy, 10 Tenn. 554 (1831); In re Nightingale, 28 Mass. 168,
174 (1831); Baker v. Boston, 29 Mass. 184, 197-98 (1831); Glenn
v. City of Baltimore, 5 G. & J. 424 (1833); Austin v. Murray, 33
Mass. 121, 125-26 (1834); In re Goddard, 33 Mass. 504, 509-11
(1835); Pierce v. State, 13 N.H. 536 (1843); Walker v. Bd. of Pub.
Works, 16 Ohio 540 (1847); Green v. Savannah, 6 Ga. 1 (1849);
Our House, No. 2 v. State, 4 Greene 172 (Iowa 1853); Mays v. City
of Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268, 272 (1853); Thorpe v. Rutland &
Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140 (1855); People v. Hawley, 3 Mich.
330 (1854); Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202 (1854); Guy v. Her-
mance, 5 Cal. 73 (1855); People v. Toynbee, 11 How. Pr. 289 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1855); State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290 (1856); Town Coun-
cil of Winnsboro v. Smart, 45 S.C.L. (11 Rich.) 551 (S.C. Ct. App.
1858); City of New York v. Second Ave. R. Co., 21 How. Pr. 257
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861); Ames v. Port Huron Log Driving & Booming
Co., 11 Mich. 139 (1863); Ash v. People, 11 Mich. 347 (1863); City
of New York v. Second Ave. R. Co., 32 N.Y. 261, 272-74 (1865);
Coe v. Shultz, 2 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1866); Roosevelt
v. Godard, 52 Barb. 533 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868); City of Bloomington
v. Wahl, 46 Ill. 489 (1868); Hayes v. City of Appleton, 24 Wis. 542
(1869); Craig v. Kline, 65 Penn. 399 (1870); City of St. Louis v.
Fitz, 53 Mo. 582 (1873); Town of Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery
Co., 70 Ill. 191 (1873); Weismer v. Village of Douglas, 64 N.Y. 91,
99 (1876); Inhabitants of Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315, 319
(1872); People ex rel. Bolton v. Albertson, 55 N.Y. 50, 55 (1873);
Toledo, Wabash & W. Ry. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37
(1873); Farwell v. City of Chicago, 71 Ill. 269 (1874); Henderson v.
Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 271 (1875); In re Deansville
Cemetery Ass'n., 66 N.Y. 569 (1876); Shepperd v. Sumter County
Com'rs, 59 Ga. 535 (1877); City of St. Paul v. Traeger, 25 Minn.
248 (1878); City of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217 (1878); Stu-
art v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183 (1878); In re Cheesebrough, 78 N.Y. 232
(1879); Lowry v. Rainwater, 70 Mo. 152 (1879); In re Ryers, 72
N.Y. 1, 8 (1878); Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 751, 765
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(1881); State v. Addington, 12 Mo. App. 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1882),
aff'd, 77 Mo. 110 (Mo. 1882); Joseph v. Randolph, 71 Ala. 499
(1882); State v. Hipp, 38 Ohio St. 199 (1882); In re Eureka Basin
Warehouse & Mfg. Co., 96 N.Y. 42 (1884); State v. Mott, 61 Md.
297 (1884); State v. Bean, 91 N.C. 554 (1884); City of Mankato v.
Fowler, 32 Minn. 364, 365-66 (1884); Miller v. Jones, 80 Ala. 89
(1885); Millett v. People, 7 N.E. 631 (Ill. 1886); In re Frazee, 30
N.W. 72 (Mich. 1886); Amperse v. Common Council of Kalamazoo,
26 N.W. 222 (Mich. 1886); State v. Divine, 4 S.E. 477, 482-83
(N.C. 1887); City of San Francisco v. Liverpool & London & Globe
Ins. Co., 15 P. 380 (1887); Quintini v. Mayor of Bay St. Louis, 1 So.
625, 628 (Miss. 1887); People ex rel. Kuhn v. Common Council, 38
N.W. 470, 471-72 (Mich. 1888); People v. Haug, 37 N.W. 21, 29
(Mich. 1888) (Sherwood, C.J., dissenting); People v. Gillson, 109
N.Y. 389, 404-05 (1888); Ragio v. State, 6 S.W. 401 (Tenn. 1888);
State v. Goodwill, 10 S.E. 285, 286 (W.Va. 1889); Chaddock v. Day,
42 N.W. 977, 978 (Mich. 1889); Hughes v. Recorder's Court, 42
N.W. 984, 984 (Mich. 1889); People v. Armstrong, 41 N.W. 275,
293 (Mich. 1889); Moore v. City of Minneapolis, 45 N.W. 719, 719
(Minn. 1890); City of Jacksonville v. Ledwith, 7 So. 885, 888--89
(Fla. 1890); State v. Mahner, 9 So. 480, 481 (La. 1891); Ex parte
Tuttle, 91 Cal. 589, 591 (1891); People v. Wagner, 49 N.W. 609
(Mich. 1891); San Antonio & A.P. Ry. Co. v. Wilson, 19 S.W. 910,
912 (Tex. Ct. App. 1892); Moore v. City of St. Paul, 51 N.W. 219,
220 (Minn. 1892); State v. Dubarry, 11 So. 718, 719 (La. 1892);
State ex rel. McCue v. Sheriff of Ramsey County, 51 N.W. 112, 113
(Minn. 1892); State v. Moore, 18 S.E. 342, 345 (N.C. 1893); Ex
parte Whitwell, 32 P. 870, 872 (Cal. 1893); State v. Loomis, 22
S.W. 350, 352 (Mo. 1893); Commonwealth v. Fowler, 28 S.W. 786,
788 (Ky. 1894); Smiley v. MacDonald, 60 N.W. 355, 357 (Neb.
1894); Low v. Rees Printing Co., 59 N.W. 362, 364 (Neb. 1894);
Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 456 (Ill. 1895); Ex parte Jentzsch,
44 P. 803, 804 (Cal. 1896); Shaver v. Pennsylvania Co., 71 F. 931
(C.C.N.D. Ohio 1896); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v.
State ex rel. City of Omaha, 66 N.W. 624, 628 (Neb. 1896); State v.
Hunt, 40 S.E. 216, 217 (N.C. 1901); Price v. People, 61 N.E. 844,
846 (Ill. 1901); Inhabitants of Winthrop v. New England Chocolate
Co., 62 N.E. 969 (Mass. 1902); Wenham v. State, 91 N.W. 421,
424-25 (Neb. 1902); City of Sonora v. Curtin, 70 P. 674, 675 (Cal.
1902); Iler v. Ross, 90 N.W. 869, 873 (Neb. 1902); Anderson v.
State, 96 N.W. 149, 150 (Neb. 1903); Ex parte Dickey, 77 P. 924,
925 (Cal. 1904); People ex rel. Armstrong v. Warden, 76 N.E. 11
(N.Y. 1905).
This principle was not confined to state cases. In Pumpelly v.
Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871)i for in-
stance (an eminent domain case) the Court rejected "[statutory]
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construction [which] would pervert the constitutional provision
into a restriction upon the rights of the citizen, as those rights
stood at the common law, instead of the government, and make it
an authority for invasion of private right under the pretext of the
public good, which had no warrant in the laws or practices of our
ancestors." Id. at 178 (emphasis added). As the Court explained
in Mugler v. Kansas, the Supreme Court held: "The courts are not
bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pretences.
They are at liberty, indeed, are under a solemn duty, to look at the
substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry
whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its author-
ity. If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to pro-
tect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has
no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable
invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of
the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the constitu-
tion." 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887). See also Brown v. Maryland, 25
U.S. 419, 444 (1827); United States v. Martin, 94 U.S. 400, 403-04
(1876); Shields v. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1877); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S.
313, 320 (1890); Budd v. People, 143 U.S. 517, 531-32 (1892) and
cases cited therein; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894);
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1898); Otis v. Parker, 187
U.S. 606, 608 (1903). Even Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes be-
lieved it proper to inquire whether the statute in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), was "justified as a protec-
tion of personal safety." Id. at 414. He found that it was not.
While this reasoning was not necessarily universal-see, for
instance, Wiggins Ferry Co. v. City of St. Louis, 102 Ill. 560 (1882),
and Braun v. Chicago, 110 Ill. 186 (1884)-the precedents were
certainly strong enough to provide a foundation for Lochner.
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APPENDIX C
The following is a list of federal cases between the 1873
Slaughter-House Cases and 1937's Carolene Products decision
that address the common law right to earn a living. This list is
obviously not complete, as I have intentionally left off cases dis-
cussed in the text and those which are already well known (Loch-
ner, for instance).
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391 (1898) ("as property can
only be legally acquired, as between living persons, by contract, a
general prohibition against entering into contracts with respect to
property, or having as their object the acquisition of property,
would be equally invalid."); Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 274
(1900) ("The liberty, of which the deprivation without due process
of law is forbidden, 'means not only the right of the citizen to be
free from the mere physical restraint of his person... [but also] to
live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation.. ."'); Atkin v. Kan-
sas, 191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903) ("If it be contended to be the right of
every one to dispose of his labor upon such terms as he deems
best,-as undoubtedly it is .... ."); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 566 (1911) ("the right to make
contracts is embraced in the conception of liberty as guaranteed
by the Constitution."); Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623, 628
(1912) ("The 14th Amendment protects the citizen in his right to
engage in any lawful business ... ."); Buchanan v. Warley, 245
U.S. 60, 78-79 (1917) ("Colored persons are citizens of the United
States and have the right to purchase property and enjoy and use
the same without laws discriminating against them solely on ac-
count of color. These enactments did not deal with the social
rights of men, but with those fundamental rights in property
which it was intended to secure upon the same terms to citizens of
every race and color.") (citations omitted); New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 374 (1918) ("to contract is a part of the
liberty guaranteed to every citizen."); Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 465 (1921) ("complainant's business of
manufacturing printing presses and disposing of them in com-
merce is a property right, entitled to protection against unlawful
injury or interference .... ."); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264
U.S. 504, 513 (1924) ("a state may not, under the guise of protect-
ing the public, arbitrarily interfere with private business or pro-
hibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary
restrictions upon them."); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 215
(1923) ("the Constitution protects... [the plaintiff] in his right to
earn a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life.")
(citations omitted); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
W. Va., 265 U.S. 70, 74 (1924) ("The validity of regulatory mea-
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sures may be challenged on the ground that they transgress the
Constitution, and thereupon it becomes the duty of the court, in
the light of the facts in the case, to determine whether the regula-
tion is reasonable and valid or essentially unreasonable, arbitrary
and void."); Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus
and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925) ("Appellees asked protection
against arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful interference with
their patrons and the consequent destruction of their business and
property. Their interest is clear and immediate, within the rule
approved in... many other cases where injunctions have issued to
protect business enterprises against interference with the freedom
of patrons or customers.") (citations omitted); Weaver v. Palmer
Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402, 415 (1926) ("The business here involved is
legitimate and useful; and, while it is subject to all reasonable reg-
ulation, the absolute prohibition of the use of shoddy in the manu-
facture of comfortables is purely arbitrary and violates the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Fairmont Cream-
ery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1, 9 (1927) ("the inhibition of the
statute has no reasonable relation to the anticipated evil-high
bidding by some with purpose to monopolize or destroy competi-
tion. Looking through form to substance, it clearly and unmistak-
ably infringes private rights . . ... "); Louis K. Liggett Co. v.
Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 113 (1928) ("A state cannot, 'under the
guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily interfere with private
business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable
and unnecessary restrictions upon them.'").
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APPENDIX D
The following state cases from the so-called "era of laissez-
faire"-between 1873 and 1937-defend the right to earn a living.
See Joyce v. City of East St. Louis, 77 Ill. 156 (1875), available
at 1875 WL 8278, at *2 (carriage licensing scheme must be strictly
construed); Commonwealth v. Bacon, 76 Ky. 210, 214 (Ky. App.
1877), available at 1877 WL 7649, at *2 ("In this country... the
right of the citizen to acquire, hold, and enjoy property is guaran-
teed by the fundamental law.... ."); Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N.Y.
509, 515 (1878) ("the right to liberty [includes an individual's]
right to exercise his faculties and to follow a lawful avocation for
the support of life; the right of property, the right to acquire power
and enjoy it in any way consistent with the equal rights of others
and the just exactions and demands of the State."); Baltimore v.
Radecke, 49 Md. 217, 230 (1878), available at 1878 WL 6549, at *6
(ordinance for prohibiting steam engines invalid because "it com-
mits to the unrestrained will of a single public officer the power"
to destroy businesses); City of St. Paul v. Traeger, 25 Minn. 248,
252 (1878) ("when, as in this case, the ordinance which is sought
to be sustained operates in restraint of an occupation or pursuit
useful in its character, and which is so recognized at common law
and under the laws of the state, it is especially necessary to show
that the authority for its passage has been expressly or otherwise
unequivocally conferred."); In re Parrott, 1 F. 481, 498 (C.C.D. Cal.
1880) ("No enumeration would, I think, be attempted of the privi-
leges, immunities, and exemptions of the most favored nation, or
even of man in civilized society, which would exclude the right to
labor for a living. It is as inviolable as the right of property, for
property is the offspring of labor. It is as sacred as the right to
life, for life is taken if the means whereby we live be taken."); In-
toxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 751, 761 (1881), available at
1881 WL 944, at *7 ("The law does not attempt to prescribe who
may and who may not become druggists. That question each indi-
vidual settles for himself."); State v. Hipp, 38 Ohio St. 199, 222
(1882) ("one who conducted such business in a lawful manner was
entitled, under the law as it then existed, to the same protection
which was accorded to dealers in other articles of personal prop-
erty .... ."); Butzman v. Whitbeck, 42 Ohio St. 223, 230-31 (1884)
(law may not invest private landowner "with the vast discretion of
determining whether the dealer upon his premises shall prosecute
his business as a lawful traffic, or whether he shall remain under
the condemnation of the law .... "); State v. Mott, 61 Md. 297,
308-09 (1884), available at 1884 WL 5915, at *6 ("it is well settled
that a power simply to regulate does not embrace a power to pro-
hibit or destroy a trade or occupation."); City of Mankato v.
Fowler, 20 N.W. 361, 362 (Minn. 1884) ("the business of an auc-
[Vol. 6:207
The Right to Earn a Living
tioneer is a lawful and useful one, and there would seem to be no
reasonable warrant... for exacting so large a sum as a license fee,
the result of which, it appears, is not to regulate but to suppress
such business."); In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 106-07 (1885) ("Liberty
• " * means the right, not only of freedom from actual servitude,
imprisonment or restraint, but the right of one to use his faculties
in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his live-
lihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avo-
cation. All laws, therefore, which impair or trammel these rights
. . .are infringements upon his fundamental rights of liberty
. ... "); Sarrls v. Commonwealth, 83 Ky. 327, 331 (Ky. 1885)
("while the Legislature has the power to regulate the sale of li-
quors to be used as a beverage, or to prohibit its sale for that pur-
pose altogether, it cannot exercise that power so arbitrarily as to
prohibit the use or sale of it as medicine."); People v. Marx, 2 N.E.
29, 34 (N.Y. 1885) ("Illustrations might be indefinitely multiplied
of the evils which would result from legislation which should ex-
clude one class of citizens from industries, lawful in other re-
spects, in order to protect another class against competition.");
Amperse v. Common Council of Kalamazoo, 26 N.W. 222, 223
(Mich. 1886) ("The right of a married woman to engage in and
carry on any legal business in her own right, and in her own
name, is no longer an open question in this state."); Potter v. Com-
mon Council of Homer, 26 N.W. 208, 210 (Mich. 1886) (Where li-
censing board refuses license to qualified applicant, "[i]t is
tyrannical as well as unlawful to hinder any one who is ready to
furnish security from conducting his lawful business.");
Godcharles & Co. v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354, 356 (Pa. 1886) ("[A per-
son] may sell his labor for what he thinks best, whether money or
goods, just as his employer may sell his iron or coal; and any and
every law that proposes to prevent him from so doing is an in-
fringement of his constitutional privileges, and consequently vi-
cious and void."); People v. Gillson, 17 N.E. 343, 345 (N.Y. 1888)
("a person living under our Constitution has the right to adopt and
follow such lawful industrial pursuit, not injurious to the commu-
nity, as he may see fit."); In re Hauck, 38 N.W. 269, 276 (Mich.
1888) ("absolute prohibition cannot be enacted under a title to reg-
ulate ...... "); People v. Haug, 37 N.W. 21, 27 (Mich. 1888) ("The
great charter made it unlawful to impose any penalty or forfeiture
which should deprive a man of what is translated his 'content-
ment,' or a person in any kind of business, whether commercial or
otherwise, of the means of continuing that business."); People ex
rel. Kuhn v. Common Council of Detroit, 38 N.W. 470, 471 (Mich.
1888) ("Liberty... means.., to pursue such callings and avoca-
tions as may be most suitable to develop [a person's] capacities,
and to give them their highest enjoyment."); State v. Fire Creek
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Coal & Coke Co., 10 S.E. 288, 289 (W.Va. 1889) ("[one has] the
right of managing his own private business . . . ."); Ex parte Ku-
bach, 24 P. 737, 737 (Ca. 1890) ("'any person is [at] liberty to pur-
sue any lawful calling ... .'"); City of Jacksonville v. Ledwith, 7
So. 885, 888 (Fla. 1890) ("the sale of [goods] may, under this grant,
be restricted to markets duly established under the other, where
the regulations do not constitute an illegal restraint or a prohibi-
tion of the trade . . . ."); Commonwealth v. Perry, 28 N.E. 1126,
1127 (Mass. 1891) ("The right to acquire, possess, and protect
property includes the right to make reasonable contracts, which
shall be under the protection of the law. The manufacture of cloth
is an important industry, essential to the welfare of the commu-
nity. There is no reason why men should not be permitted to en-
gage in it."); Moore v. City of St. Paul, 51 N.W. 219, 220 (Minn.
1892) (declaring license requirement void because of the "arbi-
trary and unequal scale of charges as is provided for .... ."); San
Antonio & Aransas Pass Ry. Co. v. Wilson, 19 S.W. 910, 912 (Tx.
App. 1892) ("Unquestionably, the legislature may subject any oc-
cupation, business, or class to reasonable regulations, when re-
quired by public interest and welfare, but in all illustrations of the
exercise of this power it will be found there was some circum-
stance of threatened damage to the public that required the regu-
lation. No well-considered case can be found sustaining a penalty
on an ordinary contract, where public interest was not involved.")
(citation omitted); Ex parte Theisen, 11 So. 901, 903 (Fla. 1892)
(discussing "the ordinary vocations of life which a man has an in-
herent right to pursue, such as keeping a market, a dairy, or con-
ducting a laundry, and the like . . . ."); State v. Dubarry, 11 So.
718, 719 (La. 1892) ("the ordinance is illegal and void, by reason of
the provisions contained in the first section, which makes the es-
tablishment of private markets thereafter to depend upon the ap-
plicant obtaining 'permission of the city council."'); Frorer v.
People, 31 N.E. 395, 397 (Ill. 1892) ("The privilege of contracting is
both a liberty and a property right .... "); State v. Costello, 23 A.
868, 869 (Conn. 1892) ("the act in question is one clearly in dero-
gation of a common private right. According to the claim of the
state, it disables a certain class of persons of full age, of sound
mind, and in all respects legally capable of entering into a con-
tract, from making a certain class of contracts. Such statutes are
to be construed strictly, and in favor of the right."); Sherlock v.
Stuart, 55 N.W. 845, 847 (Mich. 1893) ("any person is at liberty to
pursue any lawful calling, and to do so in his own way, not en-
croaching upon the rights of others. This general right cannot be
taken away."); Ex parte Whitwell, 32 P. 870, 872 (Cal. 1893) ("the
right of the citizen to engage in such a business, or follow such a
profession, is protected by the constitution .... ."); Braceville Coal
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Co. v. People, 35 N.E. 62, 63 (Ill. 1893) ("[L]iberty, as that term is
used in the constitution ... embrace[s] the right of every man to
... adopt and pursue such avocation or calling as he may choose,
subject only to the restraints necessary to secure the common wel-
fare."); State v. Moore, 18 S.E. 342, 345 (N.C. 1893) ("a man's right
to liberty includes 'the right to exercise his faculties, and to follow
a lawful vocation for the support of life.'"); Low v. Rees Printing
Co., 59 N.W. 362, 364 (Neb. 1894) ("To forbid an individual or
class the right to the acquisition or enjoyment of property in such
manner as should be permitted to the community at large would
be to deprive them of liberty .... "); Leep v. St. Louis, Iron Mtn. &
S. Ry. Co. 25 S.W. 75, 77 (Ark. 1894) ("The right to acquire and
possess property necessarily includes the right to contract, for it is
the principal mode of acquisition, and is the only way by which a
person can rightly acquire property by his own exertion. Of all the
'rights of persons' it is the most essential to human happiness.");
Commonwealth v. Fowler, 28 S.W. 786, 787 (Ky. 1894) ("Every one
has the right to follow an innocent calling without permission
from the government."); In re Eight-Hour Law, 39 P. 328, 329
(Colo. 1895) ("The bill submitted also violates the right of parties
to make their own contracts, [a] right guarantied [sic] by our bill
of rights, and protected by the fourteenth amendment to the con-
stitution of the United States."); Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454,
455 (Ill. 1895) ("Liberty includes the right to acquire property, and
that means and includes the right to make and enforce con-
tracts.... [T]he laborer has the same right to sell his labor, and to
contract with reference thereto, as has any other property
owner.") (citation omitted); Ex parte Jentzsch, 44 P. 803, 805 (Cal.
1896) ("[the challenged law] works an invasion of individual lib-
erty, the liberty of free labor which it pretends to protect.");
Shaver v. Pennsylvania Co., 71 F. 931, 934 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1896)
("employes [sic] ... are capable of deciding for themselves whether
they want to contract for such protection. It is not within the pow-
ers of a legislature to assume that this class of men need paternal
legislation, and that, therefore, they will protect them by depriv-
ing them of the power to contract as other men may."); Keen v.
City of Waycross, 29 S.E. 42, 43 (Ga. 1897) ("the law recognizes in
no one a right to create or maintain a monopoly."); State v.
Mahner, 9 So. 480, 480 (La. 1891) ("The ordinance is not general
in its operation. It does not affect all citizens alike who follow the
same occupation which it attempts to regulate."); Banta v. City of
Chicago, 50 N.E. 233, 237 (Ill. 1898) (state may tax those occupa-
tions, among others "which, because of exceptional and particular
reasons affecting public policy, are deemed proper subjects for su-
pervision or regulation by the state."); Ruhstrat v. People, 57 N.E.
41, 43 (Ill. 1900) ("[The] enjoyment by the citizen, upon terms of
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equality with all others in similar circumstances, of the privilege
of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade ... is a general part of his
rights of liberty and property as guarantied [sic] by the fourteenth
amendment.... ."); City of Atlanta v. Stein, 36 S.E. 932, 933 (Ga.
1900) ("It cannot be seriously denied that the ordinance tended to
defeat competition and encourage monopoly.... It is not within
the power of municipal authorities to enact legislation of this
kind."); Valentine v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 83 N.W. 594, 595
(Mich. 1900) ("The constitution guaranties [sic] to citizens the
right to engage in lawful business, unhampered by legislative re-
strictions, where no restrictions are required for the protection of
the public."); Hudspeth v. Hall, 38 S.E. 358, 359 (Ga. 1901) ("the
creation or encouragement of a monopoly is opposed to public pol-
icy."); Price v. People, 61 N.E. 844, 846 (Ill. 1901) (upholding regu-
lation because it "does not seek to prohibit the pursuit of the
occupation of an employment agent by a private citizen, but only
the regulation of that occupation."); City of Sonora v. Curtin, 70 P.
674, 675 (Cal. 1902) ("'[Any person is at liberty to pursue any
lawful calling, and to do so in his own way, not encroaching upon
the rights of others. This general right cannot be taken away."')
(quoting JUDGE COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 744 (6th
ed.)); Mathews v. People, 67 N.E. 28, 34 (Ill. 1903) (The Supreme
Court interprets the Fourteenth Amendment to mean "that all
persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness and
acquire and enjoy property .... "); Ex parte Dickey, 77 P. 924, 925
(Ca. 1904) ("This right of contract common to the followers of all
legitimate vocations is an asset of the petitioner in his chosen oc-
cupation, and, as has been said, is a part of the property in the
enjoyment of which he is guaranteed protection by the constitu-
tion."); People ex rel. Armstrong v. Warden of N.Y., 76 N.E. 11, 12
(N.Y. 1905) ("The cases are abundant which hold that the individ-
ual has the right to carry on any lawful business, or earn his living
in any lawful way, and that the legislature has no right to inter-
fere with his freedom of action in that respect, or otherwise place
restraints upon his movements."); Commonwealth v. Strauss, 78
N.E. 136, 137 (Mass. 1906) ("The rights relied upon under the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
.. are ... the right of every person to his life, liberty and prop-
erty, including freedom to use his faculties in all lawful ways, 'to
live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling, to pursue any livelihood or vocation . . . .'"); Wyeth v.
Thomas, 86 N.E. 925, 927 (1909) ("The right to enjoy life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness is secured to every one under the
Constitution of Massachusetts. This includes the right to pursue
any proper vocation to obtain a livelihood."); City of Spokane v.
Macho, 98 P. 755, 755 (Wash. 1909) ("The vice of the section under
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discussion lies in this: That it makes an act criminal in one who
may be engaged in a lawful business .... "); Columbia Trust Co. v.
Lincoln Inst. of Ky., 129 S.W. 113, 115-16 (Ky. 1910) ("'Every one
has the right to follow an innocent calling without permission
from the government ... .' It is useless to multiply authorities on
so obvious a proposition."); State v. Withnell, 135 N.W. 376, 378
(Neb. 1912) ("While a city having authority 'to define, regulate,
suppress and prevent nuisances' cannot arbitrarily use it to pro-
hibit harmless and inoffensive private enterprises, the acts of the
city council in exercising such police power may be held conclu-
sive, if the subject of municipal legislation might or might not be a
nuisance, depending upon conditions and circumstances."); Noe v.
Town of Morristown, 161 S.W. 485, 486 (Tenn. 1913) ("[For] any
occupation or business within common right.., the Legislature is
forbidden to create a monopoly."); People v. Brazee, 149 N.W.
1053, 1054 (Mich. 1914) ("'The Legislature of this state is not em-
powered by the Constitution to regulate contracts between its citi-
zens who are engaged in legitimate commercial business . . .')
(quoting Valentine v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 83 N.W. 594, 595
(Mich. 1900)); Rhodes v. J.B.B. Coal Co., 90 S.E. 796, 797-98 (W.
Va. 1916) ("Another rule of interpretation is that a statute in dero-
gation of the common law, which imposes restrictions upon trade
or common occupation, should be construed strictly."); Osgood v.
Tax Comm'r, 126 N.E. 371, 371 (Mass. 1920) ("Tax statutes must
be construed strictly. The power to tax must be conferred by plain
words or it does not exists. It is not to be extended by implication
or by invoking the spirit of the law."); Hamilton v. Vaughan, 179
N.W. 553, 558 (Mich. 1920) (Fellows, J., dissenting) ("prohibition
[of an occupation] must bear some reasonable relation to the pub-
lic good, or the public health, or the public morals, or the public
safety, or the public welfare. The right to regulate I concede; the
right to prohibit I deny .... [T]he right of the state to regulate a
business under its police power does not carry with it the right to
destroy, the right to prohibit .... ."); City of Waycross v. Caulley,
136 S.E. 139, 140 (Ga. 1926) ("The ordinance purports to grant an
exclusive franchise to the individuals mentioned as grantees,
which would deny a skilled butcher having an established busi-
ness the right to slaughter at the abattoir or elsewhere his own
animals for food to be used in the city. To the extent that the ordi-
nance denies such right it creates a monopoly."); New York Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Cent. New Eng. Ry. Co., 162 N.E. 324, 328 (Mass.
1928) ("[T]he act of Congress and the order of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission will not be construed to deprive the Boston &
Albany Railroad Company . . .of its vested rights unless it ap-
pears by express words or plain implication that such was the in-
tention of both Congress and the commission.").
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